












A THESIS SUBMITTED  
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE 






I have had the privilege to work with groups of terrific mentors and colleagues over the last 
four years. They have made my thesis research rewarding and enjoyable. Without them this 
dissertation would not be possible. 
First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisors: Qibin 
Sun and Ee-Chien Chang, for their invaluable guidance and support that direct me towards 
my research goals. There is no way I could acknowledge enough their help. 
I also benefit a lot from the helpful interactions with other members in the media 
semantics department. Specifically, I would like to thank Dajun He for his kindly help and 
insightful discussions. I would like to thank Zhi Li for his help of smoothing the writing of 
every chapters of my thesis. I would also like to thank other current and former department 
members: Zhishou Zhang, Shen Gao, Xinglei Zhu, Junli Yuan and Yongwei Zhu, for their 
suggestions and friendships. 
I also would like to thank my thesis committee members, Wei Tsang Ooi, Kankanhalli 
Mohan, and Hwee Hua Pang, for their constructive comments. 
I would like to thank Qi Tian, Shih-Fu Chang, Yun-Qing Shi, Min Wu, Ching-Yung 
Lin, and Tian-Tsong Ng, for their advices. 
Last but not least, I would like to thank all members of my family for their perpetual 
understanding and support of my study. I especially thank my parents for everything. No 
words can express my gratitude to my wife, Xue Yang, who has provided invaluable and 




Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................... I 
Table of Contents ....................................................................................................... II 
Summary ...................................................................................................................... V 
List of Figures .......................................................................................................... VII 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................. IX 
Chapter 1  Introduction.............................................................................................. 1 
1.1  Motivations .................................................................................................................. 2 
1.2  Research Objectives .................................................................................................... 4 
1.2.1  Error Resilient Image Authentication .............................................................. 4 
1.2.2  Passive Image Authentication based on Image Quality Inconsistencies ......... 7 
1.3  Thesis Organization ..................................................................................................... 9 
Chapter 2  Related Work ......................................................................................... 11 
2.1  Active Image Authentication ..................................................................................... 12 
2.1.1  Preliminaries of Active Image Authentication .............................................. 12 
2.1.2  Approaches of Active Image Authentication ................................................. 18 
2.2  Passive Image Authentication ................................................................................... 24 
2.2.1  Image Forensics based on Detection of the Trace of Specific Operation ...... 26 
2.2.2  Image Forensics based on Feature Inconsistency .......................................... 28 
2.2.3  Image Quality Measures ................................................................................ 30 
2.3  Summary ................................................................................................................... 37 
Chapter 3  Error Resilient Image Authentication for JPEG Images ................... 38 




3.2  Feature-based Adaptive Error Concealment for JPEG Images ................................. 40 
3.2.1  Error Block Classification ............................................................................. 42 
3.2.2  Error Concealment Methods for Different Block Types ............................... 44 
3.3  Error Resilient Image Authentication Scheme for JPEG Images .............................. 47 
3.3.1  Feature Generation and Watermark Embedding ............................................ 47 
3.3.2  Signature Generation and Watermark Embedding ........................................ 50 
3.3.3  Image Authenticity Verification .................................................................... 51 
3.4  Experimental Results and Discussions ...................................................................... 52 
3.5  Summary ................................................................................................................... 57 
Chapter 4  Feature Distance Measure for Content-based Image Authentication .. 
 ............................................................................................................................... 58 
4.1  Introduction ............................................................................................................... 58 
4.2  Statistics- and Spatiality-based Feature Distance Measure ....................................... 60 
4.2.1  Main Observations of Image Feature Differences ......................................... 62 
4.2.2  Feature Distance Measure for Content-based Image Authentication ............ 66 
4.2.3  Feature Distance Measure Evaluation ........................................................... 70 
4.3  Error Concealment using Edge Directed Filter for Wavelet-based Images .............. 74 
4.3.1  Edge Directed Filter based Error Concealment ............................................. 76 
4.3.2  Edge Directed Filter ....................................................................................... 77 
4.3.3  Wavelet Domain Constraint Functions .......................................................... 79 
4.3.4  Error Concealment Evaluation ....................................................................... 80 
4.4  Application of SSM in Error Resilient Wavelet-based Image Authentication .......... 82 
4.4.1  Feature Extraction .......................................................................................... 83 
4.4.2  Signature Generation and Watermark Embedding ........................................ 84 




4.5  Experimental Results and Discussions ...................................................................... 88 
4.5.1  SSM-based Error Resilient Image Authentication Scheme Evaluation ......... 89 
4.5.2  System Security Analysis .............................................................................. 95 
4.6  Summary ................................................................................................................... 96 
Chapter 5  Image Forensics based on Image Quality Inconsistency Measure .... 98 
5.1  Detecting Digital Forgeries by Measuring Image Quality Inconsistency ................. 99 
5.2  Detecting Image Quality Inconsistencies based on Blocking Artifacts................... 102 
5.2.1  Blocking Artifacts Caused by Lossy JPEG Compression ........................... 103 
5.2.2  Blocking Artifact Measure based on Quantization Table Estimation .......... 105 
5.2.3  Detection of Quality Inconsistencies based on Blocking Artifact Measure 109 
5.2.4  Experimental Results and Discussions ........................................................ 110 
5.3  Sharpness Measure for Detecting Image Quality Inconsistencies ........................... 117 
5.3.1  Lipschitz Exponents of Wavelet .................................................................. 119 
5.3.2  Normalized Lipschitz Exponent (NLE) ....................................................... 120 
5.3.3  Wavelet NLE based Sharpness Measure ...................................................... 122 
5.3.4  Experimental Results and Discussions ........................................................ 124 
5.4  Summary ................................................................................................................. 131 
Chapter 6  onclusions and Further Work............................................................. 132 
6.1  Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 132 
6.1.1  Error Resilient Image Authentication .......................................................... 132 
6.1.2  Image Forensics based on Image Quality Inconsistencies ........................... 134 
6.2  Summary of Contributions ...................................................................................... 134 






The generation and manipulation of digital images is made simple by widely available 
digital cameras and image processing software. As a consequence, we can no longer take the 
authenticity of a digital image for granted. This thesis investigates the problem of protecting 
the trustworthiness of digital images. 
Image authentication aims to verify the authenticity of a digital image. General 
solution of image authentication is based on digital signature or watermarking. A lot of 
studies have been conducted for image authentication, but thus far there has been no 
solution that could be robust enough to transmission errors during images transmission over 
lossy channels. On the other hand, digital image forensics is an emerging topic for passively 
assessing image authenticity, which works in the absence of any digital watermark or 
signature. This thesis focuses on how to assess the authenticity images when there is 
uncorrectable transmission errors, or when there is no digital signature or watermark 
available. 
We present two error resilient image authentication approaches. The first one is 
designed for block-coded JPEG images based on digital signature and watermarking. Pre-
processing, error correct coding, and block shuffling techniques are adopted to stabilize the 
features used in this approach. This approach is only suitable for JPEG images. The second 
approach consists of a more generalized framework, integrated with a new feature distance 
measure based on image statistical and spatial properties. It is robust to transmission errors 
for both JPEG and JPEG2000 images. Error concealment techniques for JPEG and 
JPEG2000 images are also proposed to improve the image quality and authenticity. Many 
acceptable manipulations, which were incorrectly detected as malicious modifications by 




We also present an image forensics technique to detect digital image forgeries, which 
works in the absence of any embedded watermark or available signature. Although a forged 
image often leaves no visual clues of having been tampered with, the tampering operations 
may disturb its intrinsic quality consistency. Under this assumption, we propose an image 
forensics technique that could quantify and detect image quality inconsistencies found in 
tampered images by measuring blocking artifacts or sharpness. To measure the quality 
inconsistencies, we propose to measure the blocking artifacts caused by JPEG compression 
based on quantization table estimation, and to measure the image sharpness based on the 
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Chapter 1   
Introduction 
 
We are living in a world where seeing is no longer believing. The increasing popularity of 
digital cameras, scanners and camera-equipped cellular phones makes it easy to acquire 
digital images. These images spread widely through various channels, such the Internet and 
Wireless networks. They can be manipulated and forged quickly and inexpensively with the 
help of sophisticated photo-editing software packages on powerful computers which have 
become affordable and widely available. As a result, a digital image no longer holds the 
unique stature as a definitive recording of scenes, and we can no longer take the integrity or 
authenticity of it for granted. Therefore, image authentication has become an important issue 
to ensure the trustworthiness of digital images in sensitive application areas such as 
government, finance and health care.  
Image authentication is the process of verifying the authenticity and integrity of an 
image. Integrity means the state or quality of being complete, unchanged from its source, 
and not maliciously modified. This definition of integrity is synonymous with the term of 
authenticity. Authenticity is defined [1] as “the quality or condition of being authentic, 
trustworthy, or genuine”. Authentic means “having a claimed and verifiable origin or 
authorship; not counterfeit or copied” [1]. However, when used together with integrity in 
this thesis, authenticity is restricted in the meaning of quality of being authentic that verified 






The image trustworthiness is especially important in sensitive applications such as finance 
and health care, where it is critical and often a requirement for recipients to ensure that the 
image is authentic without any malicious tampering. Applications of image authentication 
also include courtroom evidence, insurance claims, journalistic photography, and so on. For 
instance, in applications of the courtroom evidence, when an image is provided as evidence, 
it is desirable to be sure that this image has not been tampered with. In electronic commerce, 
when we purchase multimedia data from the Internet, we need to know whether it comes 
from the alleged producer and must be assured that no one has tampered with the content. 
That is to say, the trustworthiness of an image is required for the image to be digital 
evidence or a certified product.  
Image authentication differs from other generic data authentication in its unique 
requirements of integrity. An image can be represented equivalently in different formats, 
which may have exactly the same visual information but totally different data 
representations. Images differ from other generic data in their high information redundancy 
and strong correlations. Images are often compressed to reduce its redundancy which may 
not change its visual content. Therefore, robust image authentication is often desired to 
authenticate the content instead of the specific binary representation, i.e., to pass the image 
as authentic when the semantic meaning of it remains unchanged. In many applications, 
image authentication is required to be robust to acceptable manipulations which do not 
modify the semantic meaning of the image (such as contrast adjustment, histogram 
equalization, lossy compression and lossy transmission), whereas be sensitive to malicious 
content modifications (such as object removal or insertion). 
The rapid growth of the Internet and Wireless communications has led to an increasing 
interest towards the authentication of images damaged by transmission errors, where the 




guarantee that every bit of the received images is correct. Moreover, compressed images are 
very sensitive to errors, since compression techniques such as variable length coding lead to 
error propagations. As a result, image authentication would be required to be robust to 
transmission errors, but sensitive to malicious modifications at the same time. Previous 
image authentication approaches may fail in being robust to these errors. Therefore, error 
resilient image authentication is desired, which is the image authentication technique which 
is robust enough to transmission errors under some levels. 
Approaches of image authentication are mainly based on watermarking or digital 
signatures. This direction is often referred as active image authentication, a class of 
authentication techniques that uses a known authentication code embedded into the image or 
sent with it for assessing the authenticity and integrity at the receiver. However, this 
category of approaches requires that a signature or watermark must be generated at precisely 
the time of recording or sending, which would limit these approaches to specially equipped 
digital devices. It is a fact that the overwhelming majority of images today do not contain a 
digital watermark or signature, and this situation is likely to continue for the foreseeable 
future. Therefore, in the absence of widespread adoption of digital watermark or signature, 
there is a strong need for developing techniques that can help us make statements about the 
integrity and authenticity of digital images.  
Passive image authentication is a class of authentication techniques that uses the 
received image itself only for assessing its authenticity or integrity, without any side 
information (signature or watermark) of the original image from the sender. It is an 
alternative solution for image authentication in the absence of any active digital watermark 
or signature. As a passive image authentication approach, digital image forensics is a class 
of techniques for detecting traces of digital tampering without any watermark or signature. It 
works on the assumption that although digital forgeries may leave no visual clues of having 
been tampered with, they may, nevertheless, disturb the underlying statistics property or 




1.2 Research Objectives 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to develop new authentication techniques to protect the 
trustworthiness of digital images. The techniques developed can be put into two research 
topics: error resilient image authentication and image forensics based on image quality 
inconsistencies. 
 
1.2.1 Error Resilient Image Authentication 
Image transmission over lossy channels is usually affected by transmission errors due to 
environmental noises, fading, multi-path transmission and Doppler frequency shift in 
wireless channel [2], or packet loss due to congestion in packet-switched network. Normally 
errors under a certain level in images would be tolerable and acceptable. Therefore, it is 
desirable to check image authenticity and integrity even if there are some uncorrectable but 
acceptable errors. For example, in electronic commerce over mobile devices, it is important 
for recipients to ensure that the received product photo is not maliciously modified. That is, 
image authentication should be robust to acceptable transmission errors besides other 
acceptable image manipulations such as smoothing, brightness adjusting, compressing or 
noises, and be sensitive to malicious content modifications such as object addition, removal, 
or position modification. 
A straightforward way of image authentication is to treat images as data, so that data 
authentication techniques can be used for image authentication. Several approaches to 
authenticate data stream damaged by transmission errors have been proposed. Perrig et al. 
proposed an approach based on efficient multi-chained stream signature (EMMS) [3]. The 
basic idea is that the hash of each packet is stored in multiple locations, so that the packet 
can be verified as long as not all these hashes are lost. However, in this approach there 




computing overhead would be very large if this approach is applied directly to image 
authentication, since the size of an image is always very large compared with the size of a 
packet. Golle et al. proposed to use an augmented hash chain of packets [4] instead of 
Perrig’s multiple signatures for one packet. This approach may reduce the communication 
payload, but very large computing payload can still be expected. In summary, treating 
images as data stream during authentication does not take advantage of the fact that images 
are tolerable to certain degree of errors, and the computing payload would be very large. 
Therefore, it is not suitable for these data approaches to be applied directly to image 
authentication. 
An image can be represented equivalently in different formats, which have exactly the 
same visual information but totally with different data representation. Image authentication 
is desirable to authenticate the image content instead of its specific binary representation, 
which passes the image as authentic when its semantic meaning remains unchanged [5, 6]. 
Some distortions which do not change the meaning of images are tolerable. It is desirable to 
be robust to acceptable manipulations which do not modify the semantic meaning of the 
image (such as contrast adjustment, histogram equalizing, compression, and lossy 
transmission), while be able to detect malicious content modifications (such as object 
removed, added or modified). In order to be robust to acceptable manipulations, several 
robust image authentication algorithms were proposed, such as signature-based approaches 
[7, 8, 9] and watermarking based approaches [10, 11].  
Content-based image authentication, the main robust authentication technique, 
typically uses a feature vector to represent the content of an image, and the signature of this 
image is calculated based on this feature vector instead of the whole image. However, 
content-based authentication typically measures feature distortion in some metrics, so 
authenticity fuzziness would be introduced in these approaches which may even make the 




signatures or embedded watermarks. Therefore, previous techniques would fail if the image 
is damaged by transmission errors.  
Although many studies have been done on robust image authentication and error 
resilient data authentication, no literature is available on error resilient image authentication. 
Transmission errors affect the image authentication in three ways. Firstly, many of the 
standard signature techniques at present require that all received bits are correct. As a result, 
there would be significant overhead due to retransmission and redundancy in applying 
standard signature techniques to image data, which lead to the unavoidable increase of 
transmission payload [12]. Secondly, by requiring all bits received correctly, this system 
cannot verify the received image if there are errors during transmission. In this case, this 
system cannot take advantage of the fact that multimedia applications are tolerable to some 
errors in bitstreams, which can be achieved by error concealment techniques. Finally, 
transmission errors can damage embedded watermarks, removing them from the image or 
reducing the robustness. Therefore, there is an emergent need of authenticating images 
degraded during lossy transmission. The first problem this thesis focuses on is how to 
authenticate images transmitted through lossy channels when there are some uncorrectable 
transmission errors.  
Accordingly, the first purpose of this thesis is to develop techniques for authenticating 
images received through lossy transmission when there are some uncorrectable transmission 
errors. It aims to distinguish the images damaged by causal transmission errors from the 
images modified by the malicious users. It focuses on the development of error resilient 
image authentication schemes incorporated with error correcting code, image feature 
extraction, transmission error statistics, error concealment, and perceptual distance measure 
for image authentication.  
We propose error resilient image authentication techniques which can authenticate 




measure is also proposed to improve image authentication system performance. The 
proposed perceptual distance measure is quite general that it is able to be used in many 
content-based authentication schemes which use features containing spatial information, 
such as edge [7, 13], block DCT coefficients based features [8, 14, 15], highly compressed 
version of the original image [9], block intensity histogram [16]. The proposed perceptual 
distance measure, when used as the feature distance function in image authenticity 
verification stage, will improve the system discrimination ability. Many acceptable 
manipulations, which were detected as malicious modifications in the previous schemes, can 
be bypassed in the proposed scheme. The proposed feature distance measure can be 
incorporated in a generic semi-fragile image authentication framework [15] to make it able 
to distinguish images distorted by transmission errors from maliciously tampered ones. 
Cryptography and digital signature techniques are beyond the scope of this thesis, since 
they have been well studied in the data security area, and are not the key techniques that 
make our research different from others. The authentication techniques proposed in this 
thesis can produce good robustness against transmission errors and some acceptable 
manipulations, and can be sensitive to malicious modifications. Moreover, the perceptual 
distance measure proposed for image authentication would improve the system performance 
of content-based image authentication schemes. 
 
1.2.2 Passive Image Authentication based on Image Quality 
Inconsistencies 
A requirement of active image authentication is that a signature or watermark must be 
generated and attached to the image. However, at present the overwhelming majority of 
images do not contain digital watermark or signature. Therefore, in the absence of 




techniques that can help us make statements about the integrity and authenticity of digital 
images. Passive image authentication is a class of authentication techniques that uses the 
image itself for assessing the authenticity of the image, without any active authentication 
code of the original image. Therefore, the second problem this paper focuses on is how to 
passively authenticate images without any active side information from signature or 
watermark. 
Accordingly, the second purpose of this thesis is to develop methods for authenticating 
images passively by evaluating image quality inconsistencies. The rationale is to use image 
quality inconsistencies found in a given image to justify whether the image has been 
maliciously tampered with.  
One approach of passive image authentication is to detect specific operations as the 
traces of image modifications. Several specific operations have been used, such as copy-
move forgery [17], color filter array interpolation [18], and so on. Another approach is 
based on statistical properties of natural image [ 19 , 20 ], with the assumption that 
modifications may disrupt these properties. However, these approaches may be effective 
only in some aspects and may not always be reliable. They may neglect the fact that the 
quality consistencies introduced during the whole chain of image acquiring and processing 
would be disrupted by digital forgery creation operations. Few studies have been done based 
on detection of these image quality inconsistencies.  
We propose to use content independent image quality inconsistencies in the image to 
detect the tampering. Images from different imaging systems in different environments 
would be of different qualities. When creating digital forgery, there are often parts from 
different sources of images. If the image is a composite from two different sources, there 
would be quality inconsistencies found in it, which can be as a proof of its having been 
tampered with. A general framework for digital image forensics is proposed in this thesis to 




artifacts and image sharpness measures. For a given source of digital image, the distortions 
introduced during image acquisition and manipulation can be served as a “natural 
authentication code”, which are useful to identify the source of image or detect digital 
tampering. The developed digital image forensics technique would be useful in assisting the 
human experts for investigation of image authenticity.  
The assumption that the digital forgery creation operations will disrupt image quality 
consistency is adopted in this thesis. Therefore, our work focuses on the discovery of quality 
consistency introduced in the whole chain of digital image creation and modification, and its 
use in detecting digital forgeries. The results of this thesis may provide a passive way to 
protect the trustworthiness of digital images by distinguishing authentic images from digital 
forgeries. Moreover, the results of our image forensics technique may lead to a better 
understanding of the role of quality consistencies introduced in digital imaging chain for 
detecting digital forgeries. 
In summary, the objective of our thesis is to develop image authentication techniques 
to verify the authenticity and integrity of a digital image, when the image is damaged by 
transmission errors during transmission or there is no side information available from digital 
signature or watermark. Our approaches make use of techniques from various areas of 
research, such as computer vision, machine learning, statistics analysis, pattern 
classification, feature extraction, digital cryptography, digital watermarking, and image 
analysis. 
 
1.3 Thesis Organization  
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, a review of state-of-the-art related work is 
presented, including active image authentication and image forensics techniques. The 




we describe the feature distance measure for content-based image authentication and its 
application in error resilient image authentication. Image forensics based on image quality 
inconsistencies is present in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with some comments 






Chapter 2   
Related Work 
 
Image authentication, an important technique for protecting the trustworthiness of digital 
images, is mainly based on active approaches using digital signature or watermarking. The 
rapid growth of Internet and Wireless communications has led to the increasing interest 
towards authentication of images damaged by transmission errors. On the other hand, today 
most digital images do not contain any digital watermark or signature, so there is an 
emerging research interest towards passive image authentication techniques. 
This chapter examines previous works on active and passive image authentication that 
are relevant to this thesis. In Section 2.1, we review active image authentication techniques, 
including discussions on the differences between image authentication and data 
authentication, robustness and sensitivity requirements of image authentication, content-
based image authentication, error resilient data authentication, and digital signature or 
watermarking based approaches. In Section 2.2, we review the image forensics techniques, 
including the analysis of the distortions introduced during the digital image generation and 
manipulation, image forensics based on the detection of specific manipulation, image 
forensics based on passive integrity checking, and image quality measures for image 
forensics. This chapter sets up the context of our research topics of error resilient image 





2.1 Active Image Authentication 
Active image authentication uses a known authentication code during image acquiring or 
sending, which is embedded into the image or sent along with it for assessing its authenticity 
or integrity at receiver side. It is different from classic data authentication. Robustness and 
sensitivity are the two main requirements of active image authentication. The main 
approaches of active image authentication are based on digital watermarking and digital 
signatures.  
 
2.1.1 Preliminaries of Active Image Authentication  
It is useful to discover the differences between image authentication and data authentication 
in order to exploit data authentication techniques for image authentication or to develop 
particular image authentication techniques. Robustness, which is a key requirement of 
image authentication, makes image authentication different from general data 
authentication. Based on different level of robustness, image authentication can be classified 
into complete authentication and soft authentication. Content-based image authentication is 
a main approach of soft authentication.  
 
Differences between Image Authentication and Data Authentication 
The main difference between image authentication and data authentication would be that 
image authentication is generally required to be robust to some level of manipulation, and 
data authentication technique would not accept any modification. General data 
authentication has been well studied in cryptography [21]. A digital signature, which is 
usually in an encrypted form of the hash of the entire data stream, is generated from the 




binary output (tampered or authentic) for the whole data, irrespective of whether the 
manipulation is minor or severe. Even if one bit changed in the data, the verification will fail 
due to the properties of the hashing function [22]. On the contrary, image authentication is 
desirable to be based on the image content so that an authenticator remains valid across 
different representations of the image as long as the underlying content has not changed.  
Authentication methods developed for general digital data could be applied to image 
authentication. Friedman [23] discussed its application to create a “trustworthy camera” by 
computing a cryptographic signature that is generated from the bits of an image. However, 
unlike other digital data, image signals are often in a large volume and contain high 
redundancy and irrelevancy. Some image processing techniques, such as compression, are 
usually required to be applied to image signals without affecting the authenticity. Most 
digital images are now stored or distributed in compressed forms, and would be transcoded 
during transmission which would change the pixel values but not the content. Due to the 
characters of image signals, manipulations on the bitstreams without changing the meaning 
of content are considered as acceptable in some applications, such as compression and 
transcoding. Classical data authentication algorithms will reject these manipulations because 
the exact representation of the signal has been changed. In fact, classical data authentication 
can only authenticate the binary representation of digital image instead of its content. For 
example, in [23], if the image is subsequently converted to another format or compressed, 
the image will fail the authentication. 
In summary, due to the difference between image authentication and data 
authentication, it is not suitable to directly apply general data authentication techniques to 
image authentication. The reason would be that the conventional data authentication 
techniques are not capable of handling distortions that would change the image 
representation but not the semantic meaning of the content. In addition, long computation 





Robustness and Sensitivity of Image Authentication 
The requirement on a certain level of authentication robustness is the main difference 
between data authentication and image authentication. An image authentication system 
would be evaluated based on the following requirements with variable significances in 
different applications:  
• Robustness: The authentication scheme should be robust to acceptable 
manipulations such as lossy compression, lossy transmission, or other content-
preserving manipulations.  
• Sensitivity: The authentication scheme should be sensitive to malicious 
modifications such as object insertion or deletion.  
• Security: The image cannot be accepted as authentic if it has been forged or 
maliciously manipulated. Only authorized users can correctly verify the 
authenticity of the received image. 
 In image authentication, these requirements highly depend on the definitions of 
acceptable manipulations and malicious modifications. Commonly, manipulations on 
images can be classified into two categories as follows: 
• Acceptable manipulations: Acceptable (or incidental) manipulations are the ones 
which do not change the semantic meaning of content and are acceptable by an 
authentication system. Common acceptable manipulations include format 
conversions, lossless and high-quality lossy compression, resampling, etc. 
• Malicious manipulations: Malicious manipulations are the ones that change the 
semantic meaning, and should be rejected. Common malicious manipulations 





Note that different applications may have different criteria of classifying 
manipulations. The manipulation considered as acceptable in one application could be 
considered as malicious in another application. For example, JPEG image compression is 
generally considered as acceptable in most applications, but may be rejected for medical 
images since loss of details during lossy compression may render a medical image useless.  
 
Complete Image authentication and Soft authentication 
Based on the robustness level of authentication and the distortions introduced into the 
content during image signing, image authentication techniques can be classified into two 
categories: complete (or hard) authentication and soft authentication. Complete 
authentication refers to techniques that consider the whole image data, and do not allow any 
manipulations or transformation. Soft authentication passes certain acceptable 
manipulations and rejects all the rest malicious manipulations. Soft authentication can be 
further divided into quality-based authentication, which rejects any manipulations that 
makes the perceptual quality decrease below an acceptable level, and content-based 
authentication, which rejects any manipulations that change the semantic meaning of the 
image. 
Early works on image authentication are mostly complete authentication. If images are 
treated as data bitstreams, many previous data signature techniques can be directly applied 
to image authentication. Then, manipulations will be detected because the hash values of the 
altered message bits will not match the information in the digital signature. In practice, 
fragile watermarks or traditional digital signatures may be used for complete authentication. 
On the contrary, normally distortions in images under a certain level would be 




authentication should be robust to these acceptable image manipulations. These 
requirements motivate the development of soft authentication techniques.  
 
Content-based Image Authentication 
An efficient soft image authentication approach could be content-based authentication, 
which passes images as authentic if the image content remains unchanged [5]. It typically 
uses a feature vector to represent image content, and the authentication code of this image is 
calculated based on this feature vector instead of the whole bit-stream representation. 
Content-based authentication uses soft decision to judge the authenticity [5], which typically 
measure authenticity in terms of the distance between a feature vector of the received image 
and its corresponding vector of the original image, and compares the distance with a preset 
threshold to make a decision.   
Several content-based authentication schemes have been proposed [24, 7, 8, 13, 14, 
and 10], which could pass certain acceptable manipulations, and reject all the rest. The main 
difference between these schemes is what kind of feature is used. Moment is used as the 
feature in [7], edge in [7, 13], DCT coefficients in [8, 14], and Wavelet coefficients in [10]. 
These content-based authentication schemes have a common problem that there is 
typically no sharp boundary between authentic images and unauthentic images [14]. This 
intrinsic fuzziness makes challenges to these authentication schemes. A fuzzy region exists 
between the surely authentic and unauthentic images in [14], where the authenticity of the 
images is difficult to ascertain. A solution to do with this problem is to introduce human 
intervention [25], in which a human is required to distinguish acceptable manipulations 
from malicious modifications. 
Furthermore, it is difficult for these techniques to survive network transmissions and 
error concealment during transmission over lossy networks. Typically the best-effort 




Transmission errors are inevitable in lossy networks such as wireless channel 
(environmental noises fading, multipath and Doppler frequency shift [2]), or the Internet 
(packet loss due to congestion when using UDP over IP protocol). In this paper, both the 
packet loss in Internet and noises in wireless network are referred to as transmission errors.  
 
Error Resilient Authentication for Data Stream over Lossy Channels 
Authenticating data stream over lossy channels has been studied in cryptography field, such 
as signature-based data streaming authentication schemes [3, 4]. In these schemes, a data 
stream of packets is divided into a number of blocks. Within each block, the hash of each 
packet is appended to some other packets which in turn generate new hashes appended to 
other packets. This hash-and-concatenate process continues until it reaches the last packet, 
which is the only packet in this block signed by the signature algorithm. In these schemes 
the verification of each packet is not guaranteed in the presence of loss, but instead it is 
assured that this can be done with a certain probability.  
The main difference between these hash-chaining schemes [3, 4] is how to construct 
the hash chaining topology, that is, in what way the packets should be linked. Perrig et al. 
proposed an Efficient Multi-chained Stream Signature (EMSS) scheme [4] which is robust 
against packet losses by storing the hash of each packet in multiple locations and appends 
multiple hashes in the signature packet. The basic idea this scheme is that when a packet is 
lost, its hash will be found in other packets unless total packet loss of a segment exceeds a 
threshold. Golle and Modadugu [3] proposed an Augmented Chain Stream Signature 
(ACSS) scheme in which a systematic method of inserting hashes in strategic locations so 
that the chain of packets formed by the hashes will be resistant to a burst loss.  
These hash-chaining based schemes would not be suitable to be directly applied to 




several drawbacks: (1) long computation time and heavy computation load are required. The 
reason is that the size of an image is still tremendously huge even if it has been compressed; 
(2) the direct application of digital signatures to an image is vulnerable to image processing 
such as compression or contrast adjustment which are commonly considered to be 
acceptable; (3) with the increase of Bit Error Rate (BER) and the need of time 
synchronization, the transmission overhead will be unavoidably large; (4) in image 
transmission, the importance and the size of packets vary in different environments. It may 
not be practical to generate hash functions from pre-defined fixed boundaries; (5) treating an 
image as data bit stream, it does not taking advantage of the fact that image is tolerable to 
certain degree of errors.  
 
2.1.2 Approaches of Active Image Authentication  
The main approaches of active image authentication are based on digital watermarking or 
digital signatures, as well as some combinatory methods that use both of them. 
 
Image Authentication based on Digital Signature 
A digital signature is an external authentication code generated from the original message, 
which is usually an encrypted form of some kind of hash values [24]. The signature includes 
the encrypted authentication code that is to be authenticated, as well as some other 
information such as the issuer, the owner, and the validity period of the public key. A public 
key certificate is a digitally signed message consisting of two parts which can be used for 
authentication using a public key.  
Digital signature standard (DSS) is a typical technology for data authentication, which 




message of arbitrary length, a short fixed-length digest is obtained by a secure hash 
function. The signature is generated using the sender’s private key to sign on the hashed 
digest. The original message associated with its signature is then sent to the intended 
recipients. Later on, the recipient can verify whether the received message has been altered, 
and whether the message were really from the sender, by using the sender’s public key to 
authenticate the validity of the attached signature. The final authentication result is drawn 
from a bit-bit comparison between two hash codes (one is decrypted from the signature and 
the other is obtained by re-hashing the received message). Even one bit difference existing 
in the received message will be deemed unauthentic. 
Due to its great success in data authentication, DSS could be also employed in image 
authentication [7, 26, 27, 28, 29]. In this type of image authentication, the sender’s private 
key is used to sign the feature of the original image to generate a digital signature. During 
verification, a public key is used to decrypt to get the original feature, and compared with a 
feature extracted from the received image to determine the image authenticity.  
 
Image Authentication based on Digital Watermarking 
Image authentication is classically handled through digital signature by cryptography. 
However, digital signature can only work when an authentication message is transmitted 
with the media. In signature-based authentication, the digital signature is stored either in the 
header of format or in a separate file. Therefore, the risk of losing the signature is always a 
major concern. It does not protect against unauthorized copying after the message has been 
successfully received and decrypted. Furthermore, although complex cryptographic 





Digital watermarking is an effective way to protect copyright of image data even after 
transmission and decryption. It is a concept of embedding a special pattern (watermark) into 
a host signal so that a given piece of information, such as the owner’s or authorized 
consumer’s identity, is indissolubly tied to the data. This information can later be used to 
prove ownership, identify a misappropriating person, trace the marked document’s 
dissemination through the network, or simply inform users about the rights-holder or the 
permitted use of the data. 
Compared with digital signature, digital watermarking takes advantage of the fact that 
all images contain a small amount of data that does not usually have a discernible effect on 
their appearances. These data are often treated as “noise” because they are random and 
usually nonsensical. Digital watermarking creates a message that mimics the noise data and 
embeds it as a digital watermark. In addition, digital watermarks are very durable. A robust 
digital watermark can survive many kinds of image manipulations (including blur, rotate, 
cut, paste, crop, and color separation), data compression, and multiple generations of 
reproduction across a variety of digital and print media. Watermarking has many 
applications, such as broadcast monitoring, owner identification, proof of ownership, 
authentication, transactional watermarks, copy control and covert communication [30].  
All digital watermarking techniques consist of two phases: watermark embedding and 
watermark detection. In watermark embedding, the cover message and the secret key are 
combined to produce a stego object, which consists of the cover object with a watermark 
embedded in it. Then, to determine either authenticity or copyright ownership of the stego 
object, the secret key and the stego object are combined in the process of watermark 
extraction, which recovers and/or verifies the watermark. Digital watermarking can be 
divided into various categories in various ways. Generally it can be classified into three 




The most straight-forward method of watermark embedding, would be to embed the 
watermark into the least-significant-bits (LSB) of the cover object, e.g., to insert watermark 
bits into the least significant bits of an image. LSB substitution is simple, but also brings a 
host of drawbacks. Although it may survive transformations such as cropping, any addition 
of noise or lossy compression is likely to alleviate the watermark. In a word, LSB 
modification proves to be a simple and fairly powerful tool for stenography, but lacks the 
basic robustness that watermarking applications require. Yeung et al. [31] proposed an 
fragile scheme that a binary watermark is embedded into the original image in pixel domain, 
and a key dependent binary look-up-table (LUT) is employed as a watermark extraction 
function to extract watermark pixel-by-pixel. A similar LUT is used in [32], in which 
watermarking is performed in the DCT domain. Another improved LUT based scheme was 
proposed in [33], in which the key dependent LUT for a single pixel is replaced by an 
encryption map. 
There are some more robust watermarking methods which are analogous to spread 
spectrum communications techniques. Modulators and demodulators of classical spread 
spectrum communications systems are identical to the watermark embedding and extraction 
process. The noisy transmission is analogous to the distribution and distortion of 
watermarked data. The communication channel is viewed as the frequency domain of the 
data signal to be watermarked. The narrowband signal transmitted over this wideband 
channel represents the watermark. I. Cox et al proposed a spread spectrum-watermarking 
method [ 34 ]. They place the watermark in a perceptually most significant frequency 
sequence. The watermark in their system is not a binary identification word but the pseudo-
noise itself, i.e., a sequence of small pseudo-random numbers. 
In frequency domains, discrete cosine transform (DCT) domain is classic and popular 
for image processing, which allows an image to be broken up into different frequency 
bands, making it much easier to embed watermarking information into the middle frequency 




most visual important parts of the image (low frequencies) without over-exposing 
themselves to removal through compression and noise attacks (high frequencies) [ 35]. 
Another possible domain for watermark embedding is wavelet transform domain [36, 37]. 
The Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) separates an image into a lower resolution 
approximation image (LL) as well as horizontal (HL), vertical (LH) and diagonal (HH) 
detail components. One of the many advantages of wavelet transform is that it is believed to 
be able to model the Humana Visual System (HVS) more accurately, as compared with the 
FFT or DCT. This allows us to use higher energy watermarks in regions that the HVS is 
known to be less sensitive to, such as the high resolution detail bands (LH, HL, and HH). 
Embedding watermarks in these regions allow us to increase the robustness of our 
watermark, at a little or no additional impact on image quality.  
 
Image Authentication based on Hybrid Digital Signature and Watermark 
Digital signature or watermarking based technologies can be independently used for image 
authentication; moreover, it is possible to implement both of them in the same 
authentication application, providing a multiple-layer security. The content may have been 
watermarked after signature generation. The sending party encrypts the watermarked 
content to provide the second layer of protection. At the receiving end, the signature is 
decrypted before watermark detection takes place.  
A preferable solution is to embed the signature directly into the image using digital 
watermarking. It inserts an imperceptible watermark into the image at the time of recording. 
It eliminates the problem of having to ensure that the signature stays with the image. It also 
opens up the possibility that we can learn more about what kind of tampering has occurred, 
since any changes made to the image will also be made to the watermark. With the 
assumption that tampering will alter a watermark, an image can be authenticated by 




authentication system can indicate the rough location of changes that have been made to the 
image. The major drawback of this approach is that a watermark must be inserted at the time 
of recording or sending, which would limit this approach to specially equipped digital 
cameras. This method also relies on the assumption that the watermark cannot be easily 
removed and reinserted. 
In summary, the advantages of hybrid digital signature or watermarking scheme 
include: 
• Additional level of security: The hacker will have to attack both the encryption 
algorithm and watermarking algorithm.  
• Multiple uses: The embedded activating share can be a multi-purpose watermark, 
representing both the key data and copyright or copy control information. 
A robust watermarking protocol for key-based video watermarking are proposed in 
[38]. This protocol generates keys that are both very secure and content dependent using a 
cryptographically strong state machine. It is robust against many types of video 
watermarking attacks and supports many kinds of embedding and detection schemes.  
However, some applications demand the same security solution on a semi-fragile level, 
i.e., some manipulations on the content will be considered acceptable (e.g. lossy 
compression) while some are not allowable (e.g. content modifications). At the semi-fragile 
level, watermarking-based approaches only work well in protecting the integrity of the 
content [39], but are unable to identify the source if without other associated solutions. This 
is because watermarking makes use of a symmetric key for watermark embedding and 
extracting. Once the key or watermark is compromised, attackers can use the key or 
watermark to fake other images as authentic. Signature based approaches can work on both 
the integrity protection of the content and the repudiation prevention of the owner. 
However, a shortcoming exists that the generated signature is unavoidably large because its 




A hybrid digital signature or watermarking system as present in [15] generates short 
and robust digital signatures based on the invariant message authentication codes (MACs). 
These MACs are obtained from the quantized original frequency-domain coefficients and 
ECC-like embedded watermarks. The invariance of MACs is theoretically guaranteed if the 
images are under lossy compression or other acceptable minor manipulations such as 
smoothing, brightness change, etc. The whole MACs generated from the signing end have to 
be preserved in the receiving end. Thus, the size of digital signature is proportional to the 
image size. The MACs are generated strictly invariant in the signing end and the receiving 
end, so the hash function can be applied to significantly reduce the size of digital signature 
[40]. This scheme is robust to transmission errors by using error correction concepts, and is 
secure by adopting crypto signature. 
 
2.2 Passive Image Authentication 
The major drawback of active image authentication based on digital signature or 
watermarking is that a signature or watermark must be available for authenticity 
verification, which would limit this approach to special imaging equipments. Passive image 
authentication is an alternative solution to active authentication when there is no active side 
information provided by digital signature or watermark. It is a class of authentication 
techniques that uses the image itself for assessing the authenticity or integrity of the image, 
without any side information available from the image or the original reference image.  
Digital forensics has been defined by the Digital Forensic Research Workshop 
(DFRWS) as “the use of scientifically derived and proven methods towards the 
preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis, interpretation and presentation 
of digital evidence derived from digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering 




actions shown to be disruptive to planned operations” [41]. We use the phrase of digital 
image forensics as a passive image authentication technique for the purpose of evaluation of 
the image authenticity or integrity. Image forensics, in this context, is to examine the 
characteristics of content or to detect the traces of some underlying forgery creation 
operation trails in the image for detecting forgery.  
For image authentication based on digital signature or watermarking, there is a 
authenticaiton code (side information) embedded in the image or sent with it. For image 
forensics, there is no such side information available at the receiver. In order to check of 
image authenticity, it works in a passive blind way, in a very different way compared with 
active image authentication. It is often based on some prior knowledge about image 
acquiring, image statistics, and traces of forgery creation operations.  
A typical authentication decision is based on the comparison between a preset 
threshold and the distance of the pattern vector extracted (Pt) from the test image and the 
original pattern (Po) from the original image. The main differences between active and 
passive authentication schemes are:  
• For image authentication based on digital signature, the original vector Po is from 
a feature vector extracted from the image or the source entity, followed by an 
optional data-reduction stage and another optional lossless compression to reduce 
amount of data in the feature vector. And this pattern vector is stored as side 
information along with the image.  
• For image authentication based on watermarking, the original vector Po is from a 
feature vector extracted from the image or a predefined pattern. And this pattern 





• For passive authentication, both the vectors Po and Pt come from pattern learning 
stage or prior knowledge of some operations during image acquiring, processing 
and transmission. 
Therefore, prior knowledge of digital imaging system is useful for digital image 
forensics. Knowledge from traditional forensics experts would also be useful or incentive 
for image forensics. Tampered analog photos can be detected by forensic experts in several 
levels [ 42]: (1) At the highest level, one may analyze what are inside the image, the 
relationship between the objects, and so on. Even very advanced information may be used, 
such as George Washington cannot take photos with George Bush [43]; (2) At the middle 
level, one may check the image consistency, such as consistency in object sizes, color 
temperature, shading, shadow, occlusion, and sharpness; (3) At the low level, local features 
may be extracted for analysis, such as the quality of edge fusion, noise level, and 
watermark.  
Human is very good at high level and middle level analysis and has some ability in low 
level analysis. On the contrary, computers now still have difficulties in high level analysis, 
but can be very helpful in middle level and low level analysis, as complement of human 
examination. Therefore, general approaches of passive digital image authentication could be 
based on distortion ballistics (detection of the trace of distortions caused by some specific 
manipulation), image statistics or pattern classification. Image quality measures would also 
be useful in image forensics. 
 
2.2.1 Image Forensics based on Detection of the Trace of 
Specific Operation 
Although there may be an uncountable number of ways to tamper with digital images, the 




• Compositing: Two or more digital images are spliced together to create a 
composite image. It is one of the most common forms of digital forgery creation;  
• Resampling, rotating, or stretching portions of the images;  
• Brightness, contrast, or color adjustment, such as white balance and gamma 
correction; 
• Filtering or introducing noise to conceal evidence of tampering;  
• Compressing or reformatting the result image. 
Recently, some digital image forensics approaches have been proposed to detect the 
traces of specific manipulation applied to the image using statistical techniques, such as 
detecting the resampling [44], copy-paste [17], JPEG recompression [18], and color filter 
array interpolation [45, 46, 47, 48].  
Most digital cameras are equipped with a single charge-coupled device (CCD) or 
complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) sensor, and capture color images using 
an array of color filters. At each pixel location, only a single color sample is captured. The 
missing color samples are then inferred from neighboring values. This process, known as 
color filter array (CFA) interpolation or demosaicking, introduces specific correlations 
between the samples of a color image. These correlations are typically destroyed when a 
CFA interpolated image is tampered with, and can be employed to uncover traces of 
tampering. Using an approach similar to the resampling detection [44], the authors in [45] 
employed the expectation/maximization (EM) algorithm to detect if the CFA interpolation 
correlations are missing in any portion of an image. An advantage approach over EM 
algorithm was proposed in [49], which first assumes a CFA pattern, thereby discriminates 
between the interpolated and un-interpolated pixel locations and values, and estimates the 
interpolation filter coefficients corresponding to that pattern for each of three clusters. 
In [20], the authors proposed to detect photomontage by a passive-blind approach 




Photomontage refers to a paste-up produced by sticking together photographic images. 
Creation of photomontages always involves image splicing, which refers to a simple putting 
together of separate image regions, without further post-processing steps. Among all 
operations involved in image photomontage, image splicing can be considered the most 
fundamental and essential operation. The block level detection results can be combined in 
different ways to make global decision about the authenticity of a whole image or its sub-
regions 
When tampering with an image, a typical pattern is to load the image into some 
software (e.g., Adobe Photoshop), do some processing, and resave the tampered image. If 
JPEG format is used to store the images, the resulting tampered image would be double 
compressed. Double JPEG compression introduces specific correlations between the 
discrete cosine transform (DCT) coefficients of image blocks. These correlations can be 
detected and quantified by examining the histograms of the DCT coefficients. While double 
JPEG compression of an image does not necessarily prove malicious modifications, it raises 
suspicions that the image may not be authentic. If these histograms of the DCT coefficients 
contain periodic patterns, then the image is very likely to have been double compressed 
[18].  
 
2.2.2 Image Forensics based on Feature Inconsistency 
The second approach of image forensics is based on statistic properties of the natural images 
[20, 50, 51, 52, 53], linear filter estimation by blind de-convolution [54], or inconsistencies 
based on scene lighting direction [55] and camera response normality [43, 56, 57], with the 
assumption that image forgery creation perturbs the natural images statistics or introduce 
inconsistent lighting directions. Pattern noise can be used as the other way to detect the 




considered as a high-frequency spread spectrum watermark to identify the camera from a 
given image, whose presence in the image is established using a correlation detector.  
In [58], a statistical model based on Benford’s law for the probability distribution of 
the first digits of the JPEG coefficients is used to estimate the JPEG quantization factor. In 
[19] the authors propose a method which could reliably discriminate between tampered 
images from the original ones. The basic idea is that a doctored image would have 
undergone some image manipulations like rescaling, rotation, brightness adjustment, etc. 
They designed classifiers that can distinguish between images that have and have not been 
processed using these basic operations. Then equipped with these classifiers they applied 
them successively to a suspicious sub-image of a target image and classify the target as 
doctored if a sub-image classifies differently from the rest of the image. Natural scene 
statistics [59, 60] are also used in this scheme. In [19] the authors present a technique for 
capturing image features that, under some assumptions, are independent of the original 
image content and hence better represent the image manipulations. They employed several 
image quality metrics as the underlying features of the classifier. The features are selected 
as two first-order moments of the angular correlation and two first-order moments of the 
Czenakowski measure. 
If the light source can be estimated for different objects/people in an image, 
inconsistencies in the lighting direction can be used as evidence of digital tampering. 
Lighting inconsistencies are applied for revealing traces of digital tampering in [55]. The 
authors proposed a technique for estimating the light source direction from a single image. 
The light direction estimation requires the localization of an occluding boundary. These 
boundaries are extracted by manually selecting points in the image along an occluding 
boundary. This rough estimate of the position of the boundary is used to define its spatial 
extent. The boundary is then partitioned into approximately eight small patches. Three 
points near the occluding boundary are manually selected for each patch, and fit with a 




the resulting quadratic fit. The intensity at the boundary is then determined by evaluating 
intensity profile function, and repeated for each point along the occluding boundary. 
The problems faced in image forensics are extremely difficult. A basic problem is to 
determine the model of the digital camera that was used to capture the image. An approach 
based on feature extraction and classification is proposed for the camera source 
identification problem by identifying a list of candidate features [61]. A vector of numerical 
features is extracted from the image and then presented to a classifier built from a training 
set of features obtained from images taken by different cameras. Then a multi-class support 
vector machine (SVM) was used to classify data from all of the different camera models. 
The feature vector is constructed from average pixel values, correlation of RGB pairs, center 
of mass of neighbor distribution, RGB pairs energy ratio, and it also exploits some small 
scale and large scale dependencies in the image expressed numerically using a wavelet 
decomposition previously used for image steganalysis [62]. 
Fridrich et al. proposed to use the sensor’s pattern noise for digital camera 
identification from images [63, 64]. Instead of measuring the noise, they used a wavelet-
based denoising filter described in [65] to extract the pattern noise from the images. For 
each camera under investigation, they first determine its reference pattern, which serves as a 
unique identification fingerprint. To identify the camera from a given image, they consider 
the reference pattern noise as a high-frequency spread spectrum watermark, whose presence 
in the image is established using a correlation detector. 
 
2.2.3 Image Quality Measures 
Digital images are subject to a wide variety of distortions during acquisition, processing, 
compression, and transmission, any of which may result in a degradation of the visual 




systems, image coding, and processing techniques. The image acquiring and post-processing 
operations will introduce some pattern distortions which would result a quality consistency 
in the final image. Malicious modifications of the image would disrupt this quality 
consistency.  Therefore, if the image qualities of regions are inconsistent with each other, 
then the image may be a forgery.  
 
Digital Image forensics based on Image Quality Measure 
Image quality measure is generally based on some specific distortions. Using quality 
measure for digital image forensic analysis is actually to measure the distortion. There are 
many sources of distortions introduced in the whole chain of digital imaging and processing, 
as shown in Figure 2.1. Several stages exist in this chain. In a typical consumer digital 
camera, the light from the photographed scene passes through the camera lens, and then it is 
converted to digital signal by the sensors. In the third stage, the signal is then processed by 
digital imaging processor such as Canon DIGIC chips. Interpolation, color correction, white 
balance adjustment, and gamma correction are the usual operations by the processor. 
Finally, the raw data may be compressed, and saved to the camera memory [66]. All these 
stages will introduce some distortions or correlations into the final image, such as optical 
distortion by lens, noises introduced by the sensor, and artifacts by compression.  
In each stage, the distortions introduce a kind of quality consistency, which can be 
served as an “authentication code”. On the other hand, the image forgery creation operations 
usually involve decompression, transformation, composition of the image fragments, and 
retouching of the final image. These manipulations may disturb the intrinsic quality 

















Figure 2.1: Distortions of digital imaging and manipulations 
Our idea is to check the quality consistency of different regions of the whole image. 
For each region, a quality measure is calculated. Then the variance of these measures can be 
served as the authenticity of the image. The assumption is that if the image is authentic, then 
different regions of it should be quality consistent. Therefore, if the image qualities of 
regions are abnormal or inconsistent with each other, then the image may be a forgery. 
 
Image Quality Measures 
Many quality measures have been proposed in different research areas such as image 
coding, image processing, camera design and visual psychology. In practice, subjective 
evaluation is usually too inconvenient, time-consuming and expensive, therefore objective 
quality measure becomes important in many applications. A good objective quality measure 
should reflect the distortion on the image well due to, for example, blurring, noise, 
compression, and sensor inadequacy. An objective image quality measure could be 
instrumental in predicting the performance of vision-based algorithms such as feature 
extraction, image-based measurements, detection, tracking, and segmentation, etc., tasks. It 
can be used to dynamically monitor and adjust image quality, optimize algorithms and 





Image quality depends on many factors, such as the initial capture system and its image 
processing, compression, and transmission. There are two key aspects of image quality. 
• Factors intrinsic to the imaging system, such as cameras, lenses, or printers: 
Sharpness, noise, dynamic range, color accuracy, color gamut, etc. 
• Factors affected by post-processing, such as contrast adjustment, compression 
and transmission: Contrast, color balance, color saturation, lossy transmission, 
etc.  
In the image coding and computer vision literature, the raw error measures based on 
deviations between the original and the coded images are overwhelmingly used [67], with 
MSE or PSNR varieties being the most common measures. The reason for their widespread 
choice is their mathematical tractability and that it is often easy to design systems that 
minimize the MSE. Raw error measures such as MSE may quantify the error in 
mathematical terms, and they are at their best with additive noise contamination. However, 
they do not necessarily correspond to all aspects of the observer’s visual perception of the 
errors [7, 8], nor do they correctly reflect structural coding artifacts. 
In order to quantify the similarity between the test and the reference images in a 
perceptually meaningful manner, researchers have explored measuring error strength after 
processing the test and the reference images with HVS models [68, 69]. The underlying 
premise is that the sensitivities of the HVS are different for different aspects of the visual 
signal that it perceives, such as brightness, contrast, frequency content, and the interaction 
between different signal components, and it makes sense to compute the strength of the 
error between the test and the reference signals once the different sensitivities of the HVS 
have been accurately accounted for. Methods of this type are useful at determining whether 
the distortions are below or beyond the threshold of visual detection.  
Different from traditional error-sensitivity based approach, structural similarity based 




following philosophy: the main function of the human visual system is to extract structural 
information from the viewing field, and the human visual system is highly adapted for this 
purpose. Models of this group, i.e. the structural similarity index [70], are based on a 
measurement of structural information loss. 
This error sensitivity paradigm is a bottom-up approach in which researchers model the 
low-level features of the HVS to achieve consistent quality predictions. Although such 
methods have met with good success, there are many questions that arise in their design 
[70]. Some researchers have therefore explored arbitrary signal fidelity criteria that are not 
affected by assumptions about HVS models, but are motivated instead by the need to 
capture the loss of visual structure in the signal that the HVS hypothetically extracts for 
cognitive understanding. Such top-down methods have also met with good success [70]. 
For image applications with very low bit rate coding, quality measures based on human 
perception are being more frequently used [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Since a human observer is 
the end user in image applications, an image quality measure that is based on a human 
vision model seems to be more appropriate for predicting user acceptance and for system 
optimization. This class of distortion measures gives in general a numerical value that will 
quantify the dissatisfaction of the viewer in observing the reproduced image in place of the 
original (though Daly’s VPD map [13] is a counter example to this). The alternative is the 
subjective tests where the subjects view a series of reproduced images and rate them based 
on the visibility of artifacts [15, 16]. Subjective tests are tedious and time consuming and 
the results would depend on various factors such as observer’s background, motivation, etc., 
and furthermore actually only the displayed quality is being assessed. Therefore an objective 
measure that accurately predicts the subjective rating would be a useful guide when 
optimizing image compression algorithms. 




• Full-reference (FR) measures perform a direct comparison between the image or 
video under test and a reference or “original”, such as MSE and PSNR belong to 
this class as well. 
• No-reference (NR) measures only look at the image or video under test and have 
no need of reference information. Our proposed blocking artifacts and sharpness 
measures belong to this class. It is also called blind quality measure. 
• Reduced-reference (RR) measures lie between these two extremes. They extract a 
number of features from the reference image. The quality measure is then based 
only on those features. 
Only NR measures could be exploited for image forensics, where the reference image 
is unavailable. NR measures work with the assumption that all images and videos are 
perfect unless distorted during acquisition, processing or reproduction. Hence, the task of 
blind quality measurement simplifies into blindly measuring the distortion that has possibly 
been introduced during the stages of acquisition, processing or reproduction. The reference 
for measuring this distortion would be the statistics of natural images and videos, measured 
with respect to a model that best suits a given distortion type or application. For example, 
natural images do not contain blocking artifacts, and any presence of periodic edge 
discontinuity at the boundaries of blocks, is probably a distortion introduced by block-DCT 
based compression techniques.  
The following quality measures would be the most important no-reference measures to 
be exploited in image forensics.  
• Blocking artifacts: Blocking artifacts refers to a block pattern (discontinuities at 
the boundaries of adjacent blocks) in the compressed image or video. It is due to 
the independent quantization of individual blocks during block-DCT based JPEG 
compression. Due to the regularity and extent of the resulting pattern, the 




• Sharpness/blurriness: One of the most important quality factors is sharpness, 
which determines the amount of detail an image can convey. Blurriness, which is 
measured by the same way as sharpness, manifests itself as a loss of spatial detail 
and a reduction of edge sharpness due to the attenuation of the high spatial 
frequencies during filtering or visual data compression. 
• Ringing artifacts: Ringing in an image is caused by the quantization or truncation 
of the high frequency transform coefficients resulting from DCT- or wavelet-
based coding. In the spatial domain this causes ripples or oscillations around 
sharp edges or contours in the image. This is also known as the Gibbs 
phenomenon. 
• Noise: Noise is a random variation of image density, visible as grain in film and 
pixel level variations in digital images. It is a key image quality factor. Noise can 
get ugly in compact digital cameras with small pixels, especially at high ISO 
speeds. There are many sources of noise in images obtained using CCD arrays, 
such as dark current, shot noise, circuit noise, fixed pattern noise, etc. In most 
cases noise is perceived as the degradation of quality. The factors that affect noise 
of a digital image are: pixel size of the sensor, sensor characters, ISO, exposure 
time, digital processing in camera (noise reduction and sharpening, etc.).  
• Color bleeding: It is the smearing of the color between areas of strongly differing 
chrominance. It results from the suppression of high-frequency coefficients of the 
chroma components by compression due to chroma subsampling, or by CCD 







Although many studies have been done on robust image authentication and error resilient 
data authentication, no literature of others is available on error resilient image 
authentication. Therefore, there is an emergent need of authenticating images degraded by 
lossy compression or transmission. The first purpose of this thesis is to authenticate images 
received through lossy transmission when there are some uncorrectable transmission errors. 
On the other hand, image forensics is an emerging research topic. Several passive 
authentication approaches have been proposed, which are effective in some aspects but are 
by no means always reliable or form a complete solution. Therefore, the second aim of this 
thesis is to authenticate images passively by evaluating image quality inconsistencies 






Chapter 3   
Error Resilient Image Authentication for 
JPEG Images 
 
With the pervasive use of digital images over the Internet and wireless channel, there is an 
emergent need of authenticating degraded images despite lossy transmission. When 
transmission errors exist, the digital signature or watermark used in authentication schemes 
would be damaged or even made unusable. This situation motivates us to design an image 
authentication scheme that allows two parties to exchange images while guaranteeing 
content integrity and source identity, even if there are errors during transmission. The 
problem this chapter focuses on is how to assess the authenticity of an image when there are 
uncorrectable transmission errors during transmission over lossy channels.  
This chapter presents a content-based error resilient image authentication combining 
watermark embedding and feature hashing: embedding a good amount of side information 
for robust feature extraction in presence of unrecoverable errors during image transmission; 
robust image features are converted to cryptographically secure hash of small size for 
integrity verification. The proposed scheme integrates feature extraction, quantization-based 
watermarking, error correction coding, error concealment, cryptographic hashing, and 
digital signature into a unified framework. We first discuss the role of error concealment in 
this scheme. The proposed error resilient authentication scheme is then present with details. 






Watermark-based authentication approaches usually work for protecting the integrity of the 
image but not for preventing sender’s repudiation [39]. On the contrary, signature-based 
approaches can work on both the integrity protection of the image and the repudiation 
prevention of the sender, but the signature could be easily removed and no protection 
remains then. Furthermore, previous robust digital signature is unavoidably very large 
because its size is usually proportional to the image size [71, 29].  
In order to solve these problems, this chapter presents a hybrid digital signature or 
watermarking scheme. It generates short and robust digital signatures based on the invariant 
message authentication codes (MACs). These MACs are obtained from the quantized 
original DCT coefficients, Error Correction Coding (ECC) coded, and embedded into the 
image using quantization based watermarking. Similar approaches based on MACs for 
robust digital signature generation were proposed in [71, 72]. The invariance of MACs is 
theoretically guaranteed if images are under lossy compression or other acceptable minor 
manipulations such as smoothing, and brightness adjustment. However, the MACs in [71] 
are only weakly invariant, which has some exceptional ambiguous cases when two 
coefficients are the same after manipulations. Because of these ambiguous cases, the whole 
MACs generated from the signing end have to be preserved in the receiving end. 
Furthermore, the size of these MACs is proportional to the image size. In this chapter, we 
propose a method to generate the MACs that are strictly invariant in the signing end and the 
receiving end. Thus, hashing function can be applied to significantly reduce the size of 
digital signature. We use watermarks to store ECC check information and localize attacks. 
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [21] is incorporated to address the authentication 





3.2 Feature-based Adaptive Error Concealment for 
JPEG Images 
It is efficient and advisable to apply error concealment before image authentication since the 
feature of the error-concealed image would be much closer to the original one than that of 
the damaged image [77]. As a result, the content authenticity of the error concealed image is 
higher than that of the damaged image, which was validated in our experiments in 
Section 3.4.  
Error resilient techniques have been developed for image and video transmission over 
lossy networks, which can be classified into three categories: source coding, such as error 
control coding (ECC) and data embedding for error concealment [73]; joint source-channel 
coding, which aims at lossless recovery, such as Forward Error Correction (FEC), and 
automatic re-transmission request (ARQ) [74]; and error concealment which strive to obtain 
a close approximation of the original or attempt to make the output least objectionable to 
human eyes, such as error concealment using residual coefficient correlations [75, 76]. 
Error concealment is an important technique, since there are always uncorrectable errors in 
the final received multimedia signals even after applying the other two kinds of error 
resilient techniques. Error concealment techniques are usually applied by either using 
contextual relationship of adjacent blocks [77,78], or through embedded watermarking 
information [79, 80].  
Various image (spatial) error concealment algorithms have been proposed, which 
makes use of the smoothness assumption through a minimization approach. For JPEG 
images, transmission errors can be concealed by exploring the contextual relationship 
between the damaged image blocks and their non-damaged neighboring blocks, which is a 
common solution in image transmission [74]. One approach recovers a lost block by 




and its surrounding blocks [78]. This smoothness measure often leads to blurred edges in the 
recovered image. The other approaches proposed to minimize variations along edge 
directions or local geometric structures [81, 82]. They require accurate detection of image 
structures, and mistakes can yield annoying artifacts. A classification was proposed in [83] 
to takes advantage of various concealment algorithms by adaptively selecting the suitable 
algorithm for each damaged image area. 
This section presents a content-based adaptive error concealment algorithm to improve 
image quality after lossy transmission. The procedure of our proposed algorithm is 
illustrated in Figure 3. Firstly, we use some features extracted from the neighboring blocks 
of the damaged block to classify this damaged block into three types: smooth block, texture 
block and edge block. Five eigenvalues obtained from statistical measures of its neighboring 
blocks are selected as features and a Minimum Distance Weighted Linear Classification 
(MDWLC) algorithm is adopted for block classification. Different error concealment 
methods are then applied to each type of blocks: Linear Interpolation method is used for 
smooth blocks, DCT Coefficient Prediction [ 84 ] for textural blocks, and Directional 





Figure 3.1: Adaptive error concealment 
 
3.2.1 Error Block Classification 
Roughly the areas of natural images could be characterized into three types: 
• Smooth Area: where the pixel values usually vary slowly and within a small 
range. Both mean and variance of the gradients are small. 
• Texture Area: where the pixel values usually vary in a periodical way. Both mean 
and variance of the gradients are quite large.  
• Edge Area: where the pixel values usually vary significantly and within a large 
range. The mean value of the gradients is between that of type 1 and 2 while its 
variance value is the biggest among these three types. 
Five measures are calculated for block classification. They are: Pixel Variance (PV), 
Range of Pixel Variance (RPV), the Gradient Mean (GM), the Gradients Variance (GV), and 




detection, the correctly received neighboring blocks (N) of the damaged block (M) are used 
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where Mean(M) is the pixel mean of M estimated from N. Num(M) is the element number 
of N. 
We use the Sobel Operator to calculate the gradient (G) of the N, and then calculate the 
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  (3.2) 
A feature vector (F) is composed of these five features and the MDWLC is used to 
classify the damaged block, which is shown below. 
5 2
1
( ) ( ) ( 1,2,3)k i i ki
i
d f u kλ
=
= − =∑M  (3.3) 
In the above equation, fi is the i-th value of the feature vector F(M), uki is the i-th value 
of the cluster center (Uk), and λi is the weighted value corresponsive. The cluster center 
value (Uk) and weight value (λi) are both from training with a set of standard test image, and 





3.2.2 Error Concealment Methods for Different Block Types 
In view of the properties of smooth block, texture block or edge block, different error 
concealment approaches are selected for different types of blocks: linear interpolation 
method for smooth blocks, DCT Coefficient Prediction for textural blocks, and directional 
interpolation for edge blocks. 
Linear interpolation is used to conceal every erroneous smooth blocks. It recovers the 
damaged block through interpolation from pixels in adjacent correctly received blocks, as 
shown in Figure 3.2. M is the damaged block, and N is its neighboring block set. f(x,y) is the 
pixel waiting to be recovered. A, B, C and D are the nearest pixel in M’s neighboring blocks 
respectively. dx, 8- dx, dy and 8-dy are the distance respectively to point f(x,y). Then we get: 
(8 ) (8 )
f( , )
16
x A x B y C y Dd f d f d f d fx y
+ − + + −=   (3.4) 
This method uses the smoothness property of the image, so it can achieve good result 













Figure 3.2: Spatial linear interpolation 
DCT Coefficient Prediction estimates the DCT coefficients of the lost blocks using the 
adjacent error-free blocks. The DC coefficients and the first 5 low frequency AC 
coefficients (DC and AC1-AC5 from the zigzag like order of the 64 DCT frequencies) of the 
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This method can reproduce the areas of high details with high accuracy, so it is 
appropriate to recover texture blocks. 
Directional interpolation [85] utilizes spatially corrected edge information from a large 
scale neighborhood of the damaged block and performs multi-directional interpolation to 
restore the damaged block. The edge direction of the damaged block is determined by 
convoluting the neighborhood pixels with a set of directional masks and then finding the top 
three maximum directions. For each selected direction, one-dimensional interpolation is 
carried out along this direction to obtain one version of restored the damaged block. A block 
mixing scheme is performed to extract the strong characteristic features of two or more 
image, and merge them into one image.  This procedure [85] can be explained as Figure 3.3. 
This method can greatly restore the edges of the damaged block, so it is appropriate to 


















Figure 3.3: Directional interpolation 
The aim of image mixing is to extract the strong characteristic features sensitive to 
human eyes, such as the contrast of the mixed image. According to the histogram of each 
image, the pixels can be classified into three types: background, bright foreground and dark 
foreground. Pixels with values within the range of one variance distance to the mean may be 
considered as the background ones. Any pixels out of this range are considered as 
foreground, in which the ones greater than the mean are considered as bright foreground and 






3.3 Error Resilient Image Authentication Scheme for 
JPEG Images 
 
3.3.1 Feature Generation and Watermark Embedding 
Our proposed content-based error resilient image authentication uses combined watermark 
embedding and feature hashing. An amount of side information is embedded for robust 
feature extraction in presence of unrecoverable errors during image transmission, and image 
features are converted to cryptographically secure hash of small size for integrity 
verification. It is possible to design a robust feature without using side information for an 
embedding-only approach. Fox example, the adopted feature is first ECC coded to improve 
its robustness, and then embedded into the image. However, the proposed approach using 
both hashing and embedding would not only improve the feature robustness, but also 
provide a multiple-layer security: the hacker will have to attack both the hashing algorithm 
and watermarking algorithm. Furthermore, the embedded watermarks can also be used to 
detect the rough location of changes may would be made to the image.   
The proposed authentication scheme uses DCT coefficients to generate content-based 
message authentication codes (MACs), and stores some auxiliary ECC information of 
MACs in the image using watermarking. A robust digital signature of image is generated as 
follows. The original image is partitioned into 8×8 blocks. Those blocks are further labelled 
as either T block or E block. We choose T blocks for extracting content-based features 
(MACs) and E blocks for watermarking.  
All E blocks are shuffled by a random number seed RGN.  One example of partitioning 
blocks into E and T is shown in Figure 3.4. The final bit-stream is assembled in this shuffled 
block order before transmission. The reasons doing so are as follows. Firstly we want to 




already been adopted in [74, 86] to achieve a better result of error concealment. Secondly 






Figure 3.4: Example of partitioning image blocks into T and E 
For each T block, we pick up its DC and 3 AC to generate MACs. These 4 coefficients 
are quantized by the preset authentication strength matrix Qa. The quantization process is 
shown as follows. Assume the original value is D, the quantization step size specified in the 
quantization table is Q, and the output of the quantizer is quotient F (integer rounding) and 
remainder R, respectively: /D Q F= , and % *D Q R D F Q= = − . Suppose the incidental 
distortion introduced by acceptable manipulations on the original coefficient D can be 
modeled as noise whose maximum absolute magnitude is denoted as N.  
 
Figure 3.5: Illustration on the concept of error correction 
Refer to Figure 3.5, assuming a pre-determined Q>4N is known at both the signing end 
and the receiving end. If the original value D is located at the point nQ, then no matter how 
this value is corrupted, if the distortion is in the acceptable bounds, the distorted value will 
still be in the range ((n-0.5)Q, (n+0.5)Q), and the quantized value with step Q will remain 
unchanged as nQ before and after noise addition [87]. However, if the original value D 
drops into the range of ((n-0.5)Q, nQ) (Point P in Figure 3.5), its quantized value (with step 




drop at the range((n-1)Q, (n-0.5)Q) and will be quantized as (n-1)Q, not nQ, after adding 
noise. Thus the noise causes a different quantization result.  
To avoid such a case, we propose an ECC-like procedure to record the sign of R. ECC 
codes are stored as watermarks (in other blocks) and can be retrieved by the authenticator. 
We record an ECC bit ‘0’ if the original value D drops between ((n-0.5)Q, nQ) (i.e., 0<R ). 
In the authentication procedure, if this value D was corrupted, the following steps will be 
adopted. If we retrieve a 0 bit (i.e. R<0), we add the value 0.25Q from the corrupted value. 
Then, using the quantization step Q, we can obtain the same quantized value as nQ, which is 
the same as the original quantized value. Similar process is applied to the case when the 
original value D is in (nQ, (n+0.5)Q). Based on such an error correction procedure, all 
quantized values can be used to form MACs that will stay unaltered before and after 
distortion. These MACs can then be hashed and encrypted to form crypto signature, which 
is short, fix-length and robust to signal distortion with acceptable manipulation bounds. 
Here the original value D could be in the DCT domain, wavelet domain or pixel domain, as 
long as the acceptable manipulation constraint is predictable. As discussed in [8], several 
HVS models can be used to determine the setting of such constraints. 
For each T block, the 4 bits of each ECC-like codewords are then watermarked into its 
corresponding E blocks. Assuming Qa is used for generating features and watermarking 
while Qc is for actual JPEG compression. In [88], the authors have proved that as long as Qc 
is less than or equal to Qa, the robustness of generated features as well as embedded 
watermarks is guaranteed. Based on this principle, we embed the watermark of T block by 
directly modifying some AC coefficients in E. A typical ratio of T and E blocks is 1:8. 
Among 8 E blocks of a T block, we only embed the watermark into those 3 blocks with 





3.3.2 Signature Generation and Watermark Embedding 
The image signing procedure is shown in Figure 3.6. Given an image, the user generates a 
crypto signature by performing the following signing process on the image sequentially: (1) 
perform block-based pre-processing; (2) extract the DCT features and generate the 
watermarks; (3) shuffle image blocks and select the blocks for watermarking; (4) embed the 
watermarks and obtain the watermarked image; (5) cryptographically hash the extracted 
features, generate the crypto signature by the image sender’s private key; (6) send the 
watermarked image and its associated crypto signature to the recipients.  
 
Figure 3.6: Diagram of image signing 
During the image signing procedure, it is impossible to know which blocks will be 
damaged in advance (i.e., which packets will be lost during the transmission is unknown). 
However, only two cases exist: either T is damaged or E is damaged. If it is an E block, it 
will affect the correctness of watermark extraction. If it is a T block, it will affect the 
stability of MAC extraction because T has to be reconstructed at the receiver end by the 
error concealment methods. Usually such reconstruction is just a roughly approximated 
version of original T and eventually affects either system robustness or system security 
because a large Q has to be set for feature extraction in order to tolerate a large N. Therefore 
some preprocessing is required. Assuming T is lost during transmission and is reconstructed 
as T' by our error concealment algorithm [77]. We check the distortion between T and T'. If 




values on randomly selected coefficients until the modified coefficients can generates the 
same MACs as in T'. In the worst situation this recursive method results in worse visible 
quality than that of T', but the system can choose to make T equal to T' at the signing end.  
A one-way crypto hash function such as SHA-1 is applied to the MACs concatenated 
from all T blocks. In addition to these hash values, other auxiliary information includes the 
size of image, and the authentication strength matrix (Qa) is combined together and is 
encrypted using the image sender’s private key to obtain the crypto signature. 
 
3.3.3 Image Authenticity Verification 
The image authentication procedure is shown in Figure 3.7. Given the degraded image and 
its associated digital signature, the proposed solution authenticates both the integrity and the 
source of the received image by performing the following process on the image 
sequentially: (1) perform content-adaptive error concealment, if some blocks are damaged; 
(2) extract message authentication codes and watermark respectively; (3) correct the 
perturbations in the extracted feature set by the extracted watermark based on the ECC 
concept; (4) cryptographically hash the corrected feature set, obtain a short and fixed-length 
bit stream A; (5) decrypt the signature by using the sender’s public key and obtain another 
bit string B; (6) bit-by-bit compare A and B; Deem the image authentic if they are the same; 






Figure 3.7: Diagram of image authentication 
Error concealment technique proposed in [77] is used, with an additional block 
shuffling method in order to evenly distribute the corrupted blocks. The preprocessing 
process guarantees the invariance of the reconstructed images message authentication codes.  
If the image is verified as unauthentic, the attacked locations may be detected by 
correlating between the extracted watermarks and the remainders of DCT features quantized 
by Qa. This advantage could help in further convincing the authentication results. Note that 
some false alarms may exist because of other incidental distortions. This may be acceptable 
because the major system performances are system robustness and system security. Such 
false alarms can be further reduced by removing isolated detected blocks. 
 
3.4 Experimental Results and Discussions 
The proposed error concealment algorithm has been evaluated on a number of standard test 
images. We implemented our error detection and adaptive error concealment to the damaged 
images received from the simulated wireless fading channel. The Bit Error Rate (BER) is 
3×10-4. The PSNRs of test results are shown in Figure 3.8. We can see that for different 
images, the error concealment achieved different improvements, depending on the image 
content. For example, image Barbara contains much richer texture and details than Lena, so 




















Figure 3.8: PSNR (dB) results of images restored by proposed algorithm (AEC) and 
linear interpolation (LI) 
Figure 3.9 shows the error concealment results of JPEG test image Barbara. We can 
observe that the proposed algorithm can achieve better results than the linear interpolation 
on the texture areas and edge areas, such as the back of chair, trousers and tablecloth. The 
PSNR gain of this proposed algorithm is better than the conventional algorithms mentioned 
in [78, 85]. The algorithms in paper [78, 85] can achieve about 1 dB better than linear 





     
(a) error-free Image       (b) damaged Image (BER=3×10-4) 
      
(c) restored Image by LI       (d) restored Image by AEC 
Figure 3.9: Error concealment results of the image Barbara 
Figure 3.10 shows the merits of using block shuffling before image transmission on the 
stability of extracted features (MACs), by comparing the DCT value difference between the 
original and the concealed. Figure 3.10(c) is the histogram without block shuffling (the 
corrupted image is shown in Figure 3.10(a) and Figure 3.10(d) is with block shuffling (the 
corrupted image is shown in Figure 3.11(c). The number of DCT coefficients having small 
difference in Figure 3.10(d) is much smaller than that in Figure 3.10(c). Such improvement 
allows us to choose smaller Qa given the same Qc, which consequently improves system 
security with fewer false negative on missing manipulations. Furthermore, block shuffling 
also make the burst packet loss distributed evenly in the image (Figure 3.11), which improve 




     
(a) corrupted image without block shuffling   (b) image with block shuffling   
     
(c) MAC differences without shuffling  (d) MAC differences with shuffling 
Figure 3.10: MAC differences between reconstruction without and with shuffling 
Figure 3.11(a) shows the original image. Figure 3.11(b) is the watermarked image 
compressed with JPEG quality factor 8 in Adobe Photoshop, the robustness of 
authentication and watermarking is set to JPEG quality factor 7. Figure 3.11(c) is the 
damaged image due to packet loss (The BER is 3x10-4). We have tested that the corrupted 
image below the BER of 3x10-3 can still pass the authentication after error concealment. 
Note that some damaged blocks may not be detected and therefore can escape from being 
concealed. However, such misses did not affect the authentication. Fox example, Figure 
3.11(d) is the attacked image on the damaged image (window removed). Figure 3.11(e) is 




   
 (a) original      (b) watermarked image 
  
 (c) damaged image     (d) attacked image 
  
 (e) recovered image     (f) detected attack areas 
Figure 3.11: Image authentication results 
The image quality is also measured in terms of objective quality measure PSNR, as 
shown in Figure 3.12. We see that the quality of the damaged images recovered by our error 

















Signed JPEG 32.9 29.91 34.2 34.07 36.11 32.38 30.43 35.53 36.98 33.61
Damaged Image 24.22 19.35 22.68 24.54 22.71 21.77 24.03 22.81 22.53 22.74
Recovered Image 32.01 29.24 30.61 33.76 35.22 31.02 30.11 34.69 36.43 32.57
Barbara Bike Girl Goldhill Lena Mandrill Monarch Peppers Woman Average
 
Figure 3.12: Image quality evaluation in terms of PSNR 
 
3.5 Summary 
An error resilient image authentication scheme is present in this chapter, which is robust to 
transmission errors in JPEG images. Pre-processing and block shuffling techniques are 
adopted to stabilize the features for signature generation. The experimental results indicate 
that the proposed scheme successfully creates a signature redundancy in the selected block 
and its neighbourhoods, which is exploited for verification when uncorrectable errors exist 
in the received image. Furthermore, the proposed error resilient scheme can improve the 
trustworthiness of digital images damaged by transmission errors by providing a way to 
distinguish them from digital forgeries. Limitations of the proposed scheme are that it is 
suitable only for JPEG images and that it may not be robust to some acceptable image 
manipulations. For example, the authentication failed when auto contrast adjustment was 
done on the watermarked image Figure 3.11(b). In the next chapter we will present a feature 
distance measure to improve the performance of error resilient image authentication to make 
it also suitable for wavelet-based images (JPEG2000 format), and robust to some other 




Chapter 4   
Feature Distance Measure for Content-
based Image Authentication 
 
Content-based image authentication typically assesses authenticity based on a feature 
distance measure between the test image and the original image. Commonly employed 
distance measures such as the Minkowski measures (including Hamming and Euclidean 
distances) may not be adequate for content-based image authentication since they do not 
exploit statistical and spatial properties of features.  
This chapter presents a feature distance measure for content-based image 
authentication, which is based on statistical and spatial properties of the feature differences. 
This statistics- and spatiality-based measure (SSM) is motivated by the observation that 
most malicious manipulations are localized whereas acceptable manipulations result in 
global distortions. Based on SSM, an error resilient image authentication scheme is then 
presented, which is an improvement of the scheme present in the previous chapter. The 
experimental results have confirmed that our proposed measure is better than the previous 
measures in distinguishing malicious manipulations from acceptable ones, and can improve 
the performance of content-based image authentication. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Content-based image authentication is a main robust authentication technique, which 




requirement for content-based image authentication is that minor modifications which do 
not alter the content preserve the authenticity of the image, whereas modifications which do 
modify the content render the image not authentic. In order to be robust to acceptable 
manipulations, several content-based image authentication schemes have been proposed 
[7, 9, 10]. These schemes may be robust to one or several specific manipulations, however, 
they would classify the image damaged by transmission errors as unauthentic [89].  
General image authentication may evaluate authenticity and integrity of images via a 
hypothesis test: 
• Authentic (H0): the image is authentic, not maliciously modified; 
• Unauthentic (H1): the image is not authentic with some malicious modifications. 
A typical authentication decision is based on the comparison between a preset 
threshold (T) and the distance of the pattern vector extracted (Pt) from the test image and the 






t od P P T
><  (4.1) 
Content-based image authentication typically measures the authenticity in terms of the 
distance between a feature vector from the received image and its corresponding vector 
from the original image, and compares the distance with a preset threshold to make a 
decision [14, 16, 40]. Commonly employed distance measures, such as the Minkowski 
metrics [90] (including Hamming and Euclidean distances), may not be suitable for robust 
image authentication. The reason is that even if these measures are the same (e.g., we cannot 
tell whether the question image is authentic or not), the feature differences under typical 
acceptable modifications or malicious ones may still be distinguishable (feature differences 
are differences between the feature extracted from the original image and the feature 
extracted from the test image). That is to say, these measures do not properly exploit 




measures of Figure 4.1(b) and Figure 4.1(d) are almost the same, but yet, one could argue 
that Figure 4.1(b) is probably distorted by malicious tampering since the feature differences 
concentrate on the eyes. 
 
4.2 Statistics- and Spatiality-based Feature Distance 
Measure  
Content-based image authentication generally verifies authenticity by comparing the 
distance between the feature vector extracted from the test image and the original with some 
preset thresholds. Various feature distance functions, such as Minkowski metrics [90] and 
Figure of Merit (FoM) ([91]), have been used to measure similarity between the feature 
vectors representing images. Minkowski metric d(X, Y) [90] is defined as: 
1/
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where X, Y are two N dimensional feature vectors, and r is a Minkowski factor. Note that 
when r is set as 2, it is actually Euclidean distance; when r is 1, Manhattan distance (or 
Hamming distance for binary vectors).  
FoM is commonly used at measuring image similarity based on edge feature, which is 
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where NC and NO are the number of detected and original edge pixels, respectively. The di is 
the Euclidean distance between the detected edge pixel and the nearest original edge pixel, 






(a) original image 
    
(b) tampered image    (c) feature difference of (b) 
    
(d) blurred image (by Gaussian 3×3 filter)  (e) feature difference of (d) 
Figure 4.1: Discernable patterns of edge feature differences caused by acceptable 




Unfortunately, these measures do not exploit spatial information of feature or the 
statistics property of the distortion patterns, so they are not adequate for content-based 
image authentication scheme. Therefore, the image authentication scheme based on 
Minkowski metric or FoM may not be suitable to distinguish the tampered images (e.g., 
small local objects removed or modified) from the images by acceptable manipulations such 
as lossy compression. On the other hand, we found that even if the Minkowski metric 
distances are the same, the feature difference under typical acceptable manipulations and 
malicious ones are still distinguishable especially in the case that the feature contains spatial 
information such as edges or block DCT coefficients. Therefore, the Minkowski metric is 
not a proper measure for content-based image authentication. 
A new feature distance measure based on the distinguishable difference patterns is 
proposed to differentiate distortions caused by acceptable and malicious image 
manipulations. Essentially, under this distance measure, spatially clustered differences are 
less likely to be authentic compared to scattered differences. This measure is quite general 
and can be incorporated into many existing content-based image authentication schemes. 
 
4.2.1 Main Observations of Image Feature Differences 
Many features used in content-based image authentication are composed of localized 
information about the image such as edge [7, 13], block DCT coefficients based features 
[8, 14, 15], highly compressed version of the original image [9], and block intensity 
histogram [16]. To facilitate discussions, we let xi be the feature value at spatial location i, 
and X be an N-dimension feature vector, for example, N=W×H when using edge feature (W 
and H are the width and height of the image). We define the feature difference vector δ as 
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where δi is the difference of features at spatial location i.  
After examining many discernable feature difference patterns from various image 
manipulations, we could draw three observations on feature differences: 
(1) The feature differences by most acceptable operations are evenly distributed 
spatially, whereas the differences by malicious operations are locally concentrated. 
(2) The maximum connected component size of the feature differences caused by 
acceptable manipulations is usually small, whereas the one by malicious operations 
is large. 
(3) Even if the maximum connected component size is fairly small, the image could 
have also been tampered with if those small components are spatially concentrated. 
These observations are supported by our intensive experiments and other literature 
mentioned previously [7, 89]. Image contents are typically represented by objects and each 
object is usually represented by spatially clustered image pixels. Therefore, the feature to 
represent the content of the image would inherit some spatial relations.  
A malicious manipulation of an image is usually concentrated on modifying objects in 
image, changing the image to a new one which carries different visual meaning to the 
observers. If the contents of an image are modified, the features around the objects may also 
have been changed, and the affected feature points tend to be connected with each other. 
Therefore, the feature differences introduced by a meaningful tampering would typically be 
spatially concentrated.  
On the contrary, acceptable image manipulations such as image compression, contrast 
adjustment, and histogram equalization introduce distortions globally into the image. The 
feature differences may likely to cluster around all objects in the image, therefore they are 
not as concentrated locally as those by malicious manipulations. In addition, many objects 




distributed with little connectedness. The distortion introduced by transmission errors would 
also be evenly distributed since the transmission errors are randomly introduced into the 
image [99].  
The above observations not only prove the unsuitability of Minkowski metric to be 
used in image authentication, but also provide some hints on how a good distance function 
would work: it should exploit both the statistical and spatial properties of feature 
differences. These observations further lead us to design a new feature distance measure for 
content-based image authentication. 
























Figure 4.2: Edge distribution probability density estimation 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the distortion of the attacked image is concentrated on some 
objects (eyes and eyebrows in this example), and the distortion from transmission errors are 
much more randomly and evenly distributed. The reason is that the distribution of edge 
prorogation in one block is somewhat Gaussian distributed (Figure 4.2). The edge distortion 
of the acceptable manipulations can be considered as the subtraction of two independent 
Gaussian variables, thus it is a new Gaussian distribution. On the contrary, the malicious 
attacked image has strong localized relations with the original image, so the distortion 





(a) Histograms of edge differences 
 
(b) Probability density estimation 
Figure 4.3: Edge distortion patterns comparisons 
 Figure 4.3 shows the histogram of edge difference and their respective probability 
density estimates of noisy, error concealed, damaged and maliciously tampered images. 




distribution of feature differences between maliciously tampered image and the original 
image have a much longer tail than that of the error-concealed image. The damaged, error-
concealed and noisy images all have smaller right tails. The maliciously tampered image has 
a different distortion pattern from those of the acceptable manipulations. This difference can 
be exploited to distinguish malicious modifications from acceptable operations. These 
results support our observations that the maliciously tampered image has a different pattern 
of feature differences from that of the acceptable manipulations.  
 
4.2.2 Feature Distance Measure for Content-based Image 
Authentication 
Natural images exhibit strong dependencies, especially when they are spatially proximate, 
and these dependencies carry important information about the image content. Therefore, the 
feature used in image authentication will inherit some spatial dependencies or statistics 
properties. The motivation of our proposed measure is to find a way to exploit the spatial 
and statistical information in the feature differences between the test and the original image.  
Based on the observations and rules discussed so far, a feature distance measure is 
proposed in this section for image authentication. The distance measure is based on the 
differences of the two feature vectors from the test image and from the original image. Two 
measures are used to exploit statistical and spatial properties of feature differences, 
including the kurtosis (kurt) of feature difference distribution and the maximum connected 
component size (mccs) in the feature difference map. Observation (1) motivates the use of 
the kurtosis measure, and observation (2) motivates the use of the mccs measure. They are 
combined together since any one of the above alone is still insufficient, as stated in 




The proposed Statistics- and Spatiality-based Measure (SSM) is calculated by sigmoid 
membership function based on both mccs and kurt. Given two feature vectors X and Y, the 
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The measure SSM(X,Y) is derived from the feature difference vector δ defined in 
Equation(4.4). The mccs and kurt are obtained from δ, and their details are given in the next 
few paragraphs. θ is a normalizing factor.  
The parameter α controls the changing speed especially at the point mccs·kurt·θ-2 =β. β 
is the average mccs·kurt·θ-2 value obtained by calculating from a set of malicious attacked 
images and acceptable manipulated images. In this thesis, the acceptable manipulations are 
defined as the contrast adjustment, noise addition, blurring, sharpening, compression and 
lossy transmission (with error concealment); the malicious tampering operations are object 
replacement, addition or removal. During authentication, if the measure SSM(X, Y) of an 
image is smaller than 0.5 (that is, mccs·kurt·θ-2<β), the image is identified as authentic, 
otherwise it is unauthentic. 
 
Kurtosis 
Kurtosis describes the shape of a random variable’s probability distribution based on the 
size of the distribution's tails. It is a statistical measure used to describe the concentration of 
data around the mean. A high kurtosis portrays a distribution with fat tails and a low even 
distribution, whereas a low kurtosis portrays a distribution with skinny tails and a 
distribution concentrated towards the mean. 
Two distributions may have the same variance, but differ markedly in kurtosis. For 




the same, but the kurtosis of Figure 4.1(b) is much larger than that of Figure 4.1(d). 
Therefore, kurtosis is particularly helpful to distinguish feature difference distribution of the 
malicious manipulations from that of the acceptable manipulations.  
Let us partition the spatial locations of the image into neighborhoods, and let Ni be the 
i-th neighborhood. That is, Ni is a set of locations that are in the same neighborhood. For 
example, by dividing the image into blocks of 8×8, we have a total of WH/64 
neighborhoods, and each neighborhood contains 64 locations. Let Di be the total feature 
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We can view Di as a sample of a distribution D. The kurt in the Equation (4.5) is the 



















where Num is the total number of all samples used for estimation. μ and σ is the estimated 
mean and standard deviation of D, respectively. 
 
Maximum Connected Component Size 
Connected component is a set of points in which every point is connected to all others. Its 
size is defined as the total number of points in this set. The maximum connected component 
size (mccs) is usually calculated by morphological operators. The isolated points in the 
feature difference map are first removed and then broken segments are joined by 
morphological dilation. The maximum connected component size (mccs) is then calculated 
by using connected components labelling on the feature map based on 8-connected 





Since natural scene images may contain different number of objects, details as well as 
dimensions, normalization is needed. Instead of using traditional normalization (i.e., the 
ratios of the number of extracted feature points to image dimension), we employ a new 
normalizing factor θ to make the proposed measure more suitable for natural scene images, 
which is defined as: 
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μθ =  (4.8) 
where W and H are the width and height of the image, respectively. μ is the estimated mean 
of D, same as that in Equation(4.7).  
It is worth noting that the two measures mccs and kurt should be combined together to 
handle different malicious tampering. Usually tampering results in three cases in terms of 
the values of mccs and kurt: (1) the most general case is that tampered areas are with large 
maximum connected size and distributed locally (Figure 4.1b). In this case, both kurt and 
mccs are large; (2) small local object is modified such as a small spot added in face (Figure 
4.4a). In this case, the mccs is usually very small, but kurt is large; (3) tampered areas are 
with large maximum connected size but these areas are evenly distributed within the whole 
image (Figure 4.4c). In this case, the mccs is usually large, but kurt is small. Therefore, it is 
necessary for SSM to combine these two measures so that SSM could detect all these cases 





(a) small object tampered (kurt: large; mccs: small);  (b) feature differences of (a) 
  
(c) object tampered with global distortions (kurt: small; mccs: large); (d) feature 
differences of (c) 
Figure 4.4: Cases that required both mccs and kurt to work together to successfully 
detect malicious modifications  
 
4.2.3 Feature Distance Measure Evaluation 
The proposed SSM has been evaluated by experiments, compared with Minkowski metrics 
and FoM. Edge detected by [100] was selected as the feature in our evaluations. Figure 4.3 
shows the histogram of edge difference and their respective probability density estimates of 




distribution of the feature differences between malicious tampered image and the original 
image have a much longer tail than that of the error-concealed image. The damaged, error-
concealed and noisy images all have smaller right tails. These results support our 
observations that a maliciously tampered image has a different pattern of feature differences 
compared to that of the acceptable manipulations.  
Some acceptable distortions and malicious attacks were introduced into the original 
images for robustness evaluation. The proposed SSM was compared with Hamming 
(Minkowski Metric with r=1 for binary feature) as shown in Figure 4.5. Pratt’s Figure of 
Merit (FoM) [91] was also used for comparison since it is commonly used at measuring 
image similarity based on edges. Figure 4.5(a) shows the experimental results of the 
proposed SSM for image Lena after JPEG compression, and Figure 4.5(b) shows the 
experimental results for Gaussian noisy images. These figures show that the Hamming and 
FoM distances are almost linear to the compression level or Gaussian noise strength. On the 
contrary, there were some sharper changes (such as the circled points in Figure 4.5) in SSM 
curves which may be good choices for authenticity threshold. As an image can be 
considered as points in a continuous space, it is typically difficult to set up a sharp boundary 
between authentic and unauthentic images [14]. This intrinsic fuzziness makes the content-
based authentication design challenging and, likely, ad hoc in most cases [14]. Therefore, 
the sharper change of authenticity based on the proposed measure around threshold may 
lead to a sharper boundary between the surely authentic and unauthentic images, which is 





(a) JPEG compressions 
 
(b) Gaussian noises 



































































(b) results of image Bike 
Figure 4.6: Comparison of distinguishing ability of different distance measures: only 
the proposed measure can successfully distinguish malicious manipulations from 




Figure 4.6 shows the comparison results of different distance measures in terms of 
their discernable abilities. In Figure 4.6(a), the last three columns are images maliciously 
tampered from the original portrait image Lena, by enlarging the eyes, modifying multiple 
objects in the image, and adding a small spot on the face. The others are images from 
acceptable manipulations including Gaussian noise addition, auto contrast adjustment, 
sharpening, and lossy transmission (with error concealment). Figure 4.6(b) shows results of 
image Bike with much stronger edges than image Lena. The last three columns of Figure 
4.6(b) are images tampered by deleting the saddle, modifying multiple objects (changing 
logo at the left top, modifying the display of the clock at right top, and deleting the saddle), 
and adding a small spot in the center of the right circle. Note that the SSMs were all below 
0.5 for acceptable manipulations and all above 0.5 for maliciously attacked images. On the 
contrary, the Hamming and Figure of Merit (FoM) measures of maliciously attacked images 
were among the range of acceptable manipulations especially the measures of the attacked 
image in which there was a small local object changed (last column). The results show that 
the proposed SSM was able to distinguish the malicious manipulations from acceptable 
ones, i.e., identify lossy transmission as acceptable, and was sensitive to malicious 
manipulations. On the contrary, the Hamming and FoM measures were not sensitive to 
small localized object modification. The results indicate that the proposed SSM is more 
suitable for content-based image authentication than the Hamming and FoM measures. 
 
4.3 Error Concealment using Edge Directed Filter for 
Wavelet-based Images 
As discussion in the previous chapter, error concealment would be applied before image 
authentication if the image has been damaged by transmission errors. Error concealment 
technique for JPEG images has been discussed in the previous chapter. Given an image to 




a result, the content authenticity of the error concealed image is higher than that of the 
damaged image, which is validated in our experiments of the error resilient image 
authentication. This section presents an error concealment technique for wavelet-based 
images.  
The effects of errors in wavelet-based images depend on which parts of wavelet 
coefficients are corrupted. Errors in JPEG2000 bitstreams would result in the loss of a 
bitplane of the wavelet coefficients of the affected subband. The LL subband can be 
considered as a subsampled version of the original image, so errors in the LL coefficients 
are similar to the lost blocks in JPEG images. Therefore, recovery of LL coefficients can be 
achieved by some error concealment techniques developed for block-based image [74]. 
There, we only focus on concealing the errors of the high frequency coefficients.  
  
(a) Wavelet decomposition;   (b) High frequency errors 
Figure 4.7: Wavelet-based image (Bike) error pattern 
 In the wavelet domain, the energies of high frequency coefficients are mainly 
concentrated around edges in image (Figure 4.7a). When errors occur in these subbands, 
errors have effects like ring or ripple artifact around edges (Figure 4.7b) in the damaged 
image. However, edges in a natural image have important effects on the subjective visual 




the object. An image with blurred edges is always annoying to the spectator. Our proposed 
algorithm aims to remove the noises around edges and then to improve the image quality. 
 
4.3.1 Edge Directed Filter based Error Concealment 
The proposed algorithm is inspired by how experts repair damaged images, which involves 
determining the areas to be corrected, examining the boundary of these regions, continuing 
lines into these regions, gradually filling in, and painting small details [94, 95]. However, it 
cannot be applied to conceal errors in JPEG2000 images directly, because the errors in 
JPEG2000 images do not result in lost blocks. Based on the idea of how experts repair 
damaged images, we propose an error concealment scheme based on a new edge directed 
filter for wavelet-based images. It makes use of the redundancy residuals in spatial domain 
combined with those in wavelet domain. The process of proposed error concealment scheme 
can be summarized as:  
( )1 1W C W Fn nI  I+ −= o o o   (4.9) 
where In+1 is the recovered image after the n+1 iterations, and I0 is the received image. “°” is 
concatenation operation of two functions. Function F is the edge directed filtering in the 
spatial domain to remove artifacts around edges. Function W is the wavelet transform, and 
function W-1 is the inverse wavelet transform. C is a function that rectifies the recovered 
results, taking in information regarding which bit-planes are lost, as well as I0 as the input.   
In other words, the damaged image is firstly filtered using edge directed filter F, and 
then transformed into WT domain (W). The recovered WT coefficients are then constrained 
to their statistical characteristics in the WT domain by using function C. These recovered 
wavelet coefficients are then transformed into the image domain again (W-1) to get a valid 
image In+1. The constraint function C comprises the known WT coefficient values constraint 




Let ψ be the set of images comprised by those which satisfy the two WT constraints 
discussed in Subsection 2.4. The above algorithm can be viewed as an attempt to find a 
recovered image I in ψ that minimizes the distortion between I and the image F(I0), that is, 
find I which: 









4.3.2 Edge Directed Filter 
Based on the error pattern of the wavelet-based images, we can construct an edge directed 
filter to remove the noises around edges caused by errors in the damaged images. 
Anisotropic diffusion techniques have been widely used in image processing for its 
efficiency of smoothing the noisy images while preserving the sharp edges [96]. When some 
proper function is constructed in anisotropic diffusion, it can form direction diffusion or 
edge directed filter to remove the ring or ripple artifacts around edges of damaged images 
caused by errors in high frequency subbands. An edge directed filter using a new diffusion 
function is proposed in this section. 
The original anisotropic diffusion equation is presented by Perona and Malik [97], 
which can be written as a Partial Differential Equation (PDE): 
( )( )
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  (4.11) 
where I0 is the initial image, and ∇  is the gradient operator: 
I II x y
x y
∂ ∂∇ = +∂ ∂
r r   (4.12) 
The gradient magnitude is used to detect an image edge or boundary as a step 




for the damaged image. The div is the divergence operator and f(x) is a decreasing positive 
diffusion function. Perona and Malik suggested two diffusion functions: 
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( ) ( )( )2exp /f x x K= −   (4.14)  
where K is a constant with fixed value. The scale-spaces generated by these two functions 
are different: the function (4.13) privileges wider regions over smaller ones, while the 
function (4.14) privileges high-contrast edges over low-contrast ones [97].  
We adopt the anisotropic diffusion as a direction diffusion operation, and design a new 
diffusion function for error concealment. Since we only aim to construct edge directed filter 
to remove the ring or ripple artifacts caused by errors, in our solution the diffusion function 
f(x) is: 
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  (4.15) 
where Γ is the N×N pixels blocks where the damaged pixel belongs to (N=16 and k=1 in 
this chapter), and I∇  is the magnitude of I∇ . IΔ  is the Laplacian of image I, a second 
order derivative of I, defined as: 
( ) 2 22 2I II I x y
∂ ∂Δ = ∇ ∇ = +∂ ∂   (4.16) 
If ∇I  is close to M, ( )f I∇ is approximate to the minimum, and we have the direction 
filter along with the direction of edges. If ∇I  is very small, ( )f I∇  is approximate to the 
maximum, and now we could achieve isotropic diffusion (like Gaussian filter).  
M and IΔ are used to make that the conduction coefficients of the ring or ripple 




are always smaller than those of edges. Thus the artifacts are made to be filtered smoothly, 
but edges are kept sharp.   
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Δ= + ∇ ⋅∇∑  (4.17) 
This process constructs edge directed filter served as edge directed filter F in 
Equation(4.9).  
 
4.3.3 Wavelet Domain Constraint Functions  
Two WT domain constraint functions are applied in wavelet domain: known-value 
constraint function C1, and WT statistical constraint function C2 to rectify the recovered 
coefficients.  
After the damaged image is filtered by edge directed filter, the lost WT coefficients are 
recovered. However, the correctly received WT coefficients (denoted as Ф) may also be 













where x0 is the original wavelet coefficients of x before edge directed filtering.  
Furthermore, although WT almost decorrelates WT coefficients, the distribution of one 
coefficient conditioned on its parent P usually is a linear function of P [8]. It means that the 
coefficients are still statistically dependent. For high-amplitude coefficients, if the parent is 
less than some threshold (e.g., one standard deviation) then the child is also most likely to 
be less than the threshold [8]. Moreover, wavelet coefficients also show their statistical 




characteristics may not be kept anymore. Thus, the image set Ω within statistical 
characteristics is used to construct a function to discard the recovered wavelet coefficients 









  (4.19) 
Then we get ψ (ψ = Ω ∩ Ф), and C (C = C1 ° C2.). 
 
4.3.4 Error Concealment Evaluation 
In our experimental evaluation, the error detection can be done by the error resilience tools 
issued in JPEG2000 [98]. We use five-level wavelet decomposition.  
The details of improvement of the damaged image Monarch by our proposed algorithm 
is shown in Figure 4.8. We can see that the annoying noises around edges have been almost 
removed. And the recovered areas have high continuity, which visually makes the spectators 
much comfortable. The cost is the decrease in the contrast. But such change is not easily 
caught by human eyes.  
The PSNR results are listed in Table 4.1. The bit error rate (BER) is set to 10-4. In 
terms of PSNR, the improvement on the quality of the damaged images is significant, 
though the improvement varies from image to image. For example, image Monarch contains 
much more clear edges and in stronger contrast than Lake, so it can achieve better result 
than Lake. 
Considering that the criterion of PSNR does not always provide an accurate measure of 
the visual quality for natural images. To evaluate the performances on edge preservation of 
the proposed algorithm, we further use Figure of Merit (FoM). The FoM values of the 
results are also listed in Table 4.1. We used Canny edge detector, and the standard deviation 




the recovered images are close to 1, which shows high edge preserving ratios are achieved 
by the proposed error concealment algorithm. 
The efficiency of our proposed diffusion function (Equation (4.15)) is illustrated 
in Figure 4.9, compared with the classic Laplacian edge enhancement filter (detailed in 
[10]), and the two anisotropic diffusion functions proposed by Perona and Malik (Equation 
(4.13) and (4.14), K = 25). These filters are all used in the same error concealment scheme 
defined by Equation (4.11). 
     
(a) original image;        (b) damaged image; 
 
(c) recovered image 




Table 4.1: Image quality evaluation of error concealment 
Image Quality Actor Bike Chart Fruits Hotel Lake Lena Monarch Peppers Average
Damaged 
Images 
PSNR (dB) 30.76 30.34 33.85 33.63 33.83 31.37 33.31 29.49 33.05 32.18 
FoM (%) 88.5 88.0 91.3 88.7 88.0 89.1 89.0 89.2 87.3 88.8 
Recovered 
Images 
PSNR (dB) 38.24 38.55 40.13 39.21 41.79 38.37 40.02 39.57 40.77 39.63 
FoM (%) 94.5 95.2 96.3 94.2 95.5 93.9 93.7 94.2 91.2 94.3 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Comparison of diffusion functions (Lena) 
Figure 4.9 shows the progressive visual results of image Lena, done by our proposed 
error concealment algorithm. We can see that after a few iterations (5 to 10 times), the 
noises around edges are almost removed. 
 
4.4 Application of SSM in Error Resilient Wavelet-
based Image Authentication 
The proposed feature distance measure SSM is quite general that it is able to be used in 
many content-based authentication schemes which use features containing spatial 
information. When used as the feature distance function in image authenticity verification 




manipulations. Many acceptable manipulations, which were detected as malicious 
modifications in the previous schemes, can be bypassed in the scheme using SSM. 
JPEG2000, an emerging wavelet-based image compression standard, can operate at 
higher compression ratios without generating the typical blocking artifacts of the previous 
DCT-based JPEG standard. It also allows more sophisticated progressive downloads. The 
error resilient image authentication scheme present in the previous chapter is only suitable 
for JPEG images. It is not suitable for wavelet-based images. This section presents an 
improved error resilient image authentication scheme which is applicable to both JPEG and 
JPEG2000 images.  
The improved error resilient scheme exploits the proposed feature distance measure 
SSM in a generic semi-fragile image authentication framework [15] to distinguish images 
distorted by transmission errors from maliciously modified ones. The experimental results 
support that the proposed feature distance measure can improve the performance of the 
previous scheme in terms of robustness and sensitivity. The results of this error resilient 
authentication scheme validate that the proposed SSM can improve the authentication 
performance.  
 
4.4.1 Feature Extraction 
One basic requirement for selecting feature for content-based image authentication is that 
the feature should be sensitive to malicious attacks on the image content. Edge-based 
features would be a good choice because usually malicious tampering will incur the changes 
on edges. Furthermore, edge may also be robust to some distortions. For instances, the 
results in [99] show that high edge preserving ratios can be achieved even if there are 
uncorrectable transmission errors. Therefore, the remaining issue is to make the edge more 




employ the normalization in Equation (4.8) to suppress those “acceptable” distortions 
around edges.  
In [100], a method based on fuzzy reasoning is proposed to classify each pixel of a 
gray-value image into a shaped, textured, or smooth feature point. We adopt their fuzzy 
reasoning based detector because of its good robustness.  
 
4.4.2 Signature Generation and Watermark Embedding  
The image signing procedure is outlined in Figure 4.10. Binary edge of the original image is 
extracted using the fuzzy reasoning based edge detection method [100]. Then, the edge 
feature is divided into 8×8 blocks, and edge point number in each block is encoded by error 
correcting code (ECC) [10]. BCH(7,4,1) is used to generate one parity check bit (PCB) for 
ECC codeword (edge point number) for every 8×8 block. The signature is generated by 
hashing and encrypting the concatenated ECC codewords using a private key. Finally, the 
PCB bits are embedded into the DCT coefficients of the image. In our implementation, the 
PCB bits are embedded into the middle-low frequency DCT coefficients using the same 




















Figure 4.10: Signing process of the proposed error resilient image authentication 
scheme 
Let the total selected DCT coefficients form a set P. For each coefficient c  in P, it is 
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where w (0 or 1) is the bit to be embedded. Function round(x) returns the nearest integrate of 
x, sgn(x) returns the sign of x, and LSB(x) returns the least significant bit of x. Equation 
(4.20) makes sure that the LSB of the coefficient is the same as the watermark bit. 
The watermarking procedure would introduce some distortions into the image, which 
makes the re-extracted features different from those of the original image. Therefore, the 
embedding procedure should not affect the feature extracted. In order to exclude the effect 
of watermarking from feature extraction, a compensation operator Cw is adopted before 









( ){ }( ) IDCT IntQuan ,2 ,w iC I d Q= P  (4.22) 
where di is the i-th DCT coefficient of I, and IDCT is inverse DCT transform. fe(I) is the 
watermarking function, and Iw is the final watermarked image. The IntQuan(c, P, Q) 
function is defined as: 
( ) , if IntQuan , ,






P  (4.23) 
Cw is designed according to the watermarking algorithm, which uses 2Q to pre-
quantize the DCT coefficients before feature extraction and watermarking. That is, from 
Equation (4.20), (4.22) and (4.23), we can get Cw(Iw) = Cw(I), thus fe(Iw) = fe(I), i.e., the 
feature extracted from the original image I is the same as the one from the watermarked 






4.4.3 Image Authenticity Verification 
The image verification procedure, shown in Figure 4.11, can be viewed as an inverse 
procedure of image signing. Firstly, error concealment is carried out if transmission errors 
are detected. The feature of the image is extracted using the same method as used in image 
signing procedure. Watermarks are then extracted. If there are no uncorrectable errors in the 
ECC codewords, the authentication is based on bit-wise comparison between the decrypted 
hashed feature and the hashed feature extracted from the image [10]. Otherwise, image 
authenticity is calculated by the SSM based on differences between the PCB bits of the re-
extracted feature and the extracted watermark. Finally, if the image is identified as 



























Figure 4.11: Image authentication process of the proposed error resilient image 
authentication scheme 
 
Image Authenticity Verification 
Image authenticity is calculated based on the binary difference map which is created by 
comparing the PCB bits decoded from extracted watermark and the recalculated PCB bits 




are recalculated using the same method as used in image signing procedure. The difference 
map is obtained by differentiating these two PCB vectors.  
Given an image to be verified, we repeat feature extraction described in image signing 
procedure. The corresponding PCB bits (PCBW) of all 8×8 blocks (one bit/block) of the 
image are extracted from the embedded watermarks. Then the feature set extracted from the 
image is combined with the corresponding PCB bits to form ECC codewords. If all 
codewords are correctable, we concatenate all codewords and cryptographically hash the 
result sequence. The final authentication result is then concluded by bit-by-bit comparison 
between these two hashed sets. If there are uncorrectable errors in ECC codewords, image 
authenticity is calculated based on the proposed distance measure. The two feature vectors 
in the proposed measure are PCBW from watermarks and the recalculated PCB bits (PCBF) 
from ECC coding of the re-extracted image feature set. If the distance measure between 
PCBW and PCBF is smaller than 0.5 (SSM(PCBW, PCBF)<0.5), the image is deemed 
authentic. Otherwise, the image is deemed unauthentic.   
 
Feature Aided Attack Location 
If the image is verified as unauthentic, the tampered areas could be detected. Attack location 
is an important part of the authentication result since the detected attacked areas give the 
users a clear figure where the image has possibly been tampered with. The diagram of our 
feature aided attack location algorithm is shown in Figure 4.12. The attack areas are 
detected using information from watermarks and image feature. The difference map 
between PCBW and PCBF is calculated, and then morphological operations are used to 
compute the connected areas, with isolated pixels and small connected areas removed. After 
these operations, the difference map is masked with the union of the watermark and the 
feature. The masking operation can refine the detected areas by concentrating them on the 




which do not belong to any object (defined by edge feature) are removed, which may be a 













Figure 4.12: The diagram of feature aided attack localization 
It is worth noting that the authentication result of our scheme is friendly to users. Since 
human perceptivity treats image as a combination of objects, some objects may be the 
region of interest (ROI) to users. If the image fails to pass the authentication, our scheme 
provides possible attacked areas which concentrate on objects. If these detected areas are not 
the user’s ROI, further decision can be made by the user on a case by case basis. Finally, 
this scheme can also provide a degree of authenticity (by SSM measure) to the user which 
gives the user a confidence on the trustiness of the image. 
 
4.5 Experimental Results and Discussions 
To support our solutions, experimental results have been collected on the proposed error 
concealment, feature distance measure, and error resilient image authentication. In our 
experiments, JPEG and JPEG2000 images were used. Test images include Actor, Barbara, 
Bike, Airplane, Fruits, Girl, GoldenHill, Lena, Mandrill, Monarch, Pepper, Woman, and so 
on. The dimensions of these images include 512×512, 640×512, 640×800, and 720×576. 
Daubechies 9/7 wavelet filter is used for the wavelet transform (which is also applied in the 






4.5.1 SSM-based Error Resilient Image Authentication 
Scheme Evaluation 
Robustness to Transmission Errors and other Acceptable 
Manipulations 
The transmission errors in wireless networks were simulated based on the Rayleigh model 
[102] which is commonly used for wireless networks. Figure 4.13(b) is an example of 
wavelet-based images damaged by transmission errors, and Figure 4.13(c) is its error-
concealed result. Figure 4.13(d) is a DCT-based image damaged by transmission errors, 
and Figure 4.13(e) is its error concealed result. The SSM values of image Figure 4.13(c) 
and Figure 4.13(e) are 0.134 and 0.250, i.e., the error-concealed images are both authentic.  
With the set of images produced, the average peak signal-to-noise ratio (defined by 
PSNR) of our watermarked images is 44.46 dB (Table 4.2), which is above the usually 
tolerated degradation level of 40 dB [103] and much higher than the average 33.45dB in 
[15]. It is also better than the 42.47 dB obtained by the paper [103]. The quantization table 
used in these experiments is JPEG recommended quantization table of Q50. These results 







(a) original image 
   
 (b) damaged image (wavelet based) (c) error concealed image of (b) 
   
(d) damaged image (DCT based)  (e) error concealed image of (c) 




Table 4.2 shows the evaluation results of the system robustness of the proposed error 
resilient image authentication scheme based on the proposed SSM. PSNR and SSM 
measures of the images damaged by transmission errors with different bit error rate of the 
transmitted images (BER) 10-4 and 2×10-4. The corresponding PSNR and SSM of the error-
concealed images are also listed in this table. 60% of the damaged images at BER 10-4 and 
100% at BER 2×10-4 in our experiments were verified as unauthentic. On the contrary, all 
error-concealed images were verified as authentic. These results indicate that our proposed 
scheme could obtain a good robustness to transmission errors. Note that on the contrary, the 
authentication scheme [103] was not robust to transmission errors. These results further 
confirm that it is effective and advisable for error concealment to be applied before image 
authentication. The reason why the authenticities of the recovered images were better than 
those of the damaged images may be the image quality improvement by using error 
concealment on the damaged images [99, 77]. For example, the recovered image had much 
better objective qualities than the damaged images (evaluated by PSNR). This quality 
improvement made features of the error-concealed images closer to those of the original 
images than damaged images, so that the image authenticities (evaluated by SSM) of the 
error-concealed images were much larger than the damaged images. 
 
Table 4.2: Comparison of objective quality reduction introduced by watermarking: 
PSNR(dB) of watermarked images 
PSNR  Barbara Bike Airplane Girl Goldhill Lena Mandrill Monarch Pepper Woman
Proposed 44.17 44.40 44.56 44.39 44.32 44.60 44.14 44.75 44.46 44.79 
Ref. [15] 32.90 29.91 32.01 34.20 34.07 36.11 32.38 30.43 35.53 36.98 






Table 4.3: Authentication performance improved by error concealment:  
PSNR (dB) and SSM of damaged images and error-concealed images  
(BER1:10-4; BER2:2×10-4) 
Images Actor Bike Chart Flight Fruits Hotel Lake Lena Pepper Woman
Damaged 
PSNR 
BER1 30.78 31.26 33.95 32.41 33.68 33.87 31.39 33.31 33.07 35.50 
BER2 25.87 25.76 28.51 26.05 27.81 26.71 25.68 30.34 27.74 30.72 
Damaged 
SSM 
BER1 0.948 0.939 0.707 0.297 0.794 0.365 0.143 0.391 0.729 0.989 
BER2 0.812 0.999 0.987 0.951 0.942 0.568 0.883 0.638 0.865 0.955 
Recovered 
PSNR 
BER1 38.03 41.76 41.11 41.03 39.90 42.40 38.54 40.21 41.25 42.96 
BER2 32.06 34.99 34.74 34.06 31.68 33.26 31.64 36.03 33.85 36.84 
Recovered 
SSM 
BER1 0.158 0.134 0.141 0.035 0.204 0.067 0.057 0.345 0.089 0.329 
BER2 0.220 0.099 0.446 0.072 0.406 0.045 0.280 0.059 0.182 0.015 
 
Our scheme was also tested on other acceptable manipulations such as image contrast 
adjustment, histogram equalization, compression and noises addition. The results are shown 
in Table 4.4, with the parameter for each manipulation. The SSM values of these images 
were all less than 0.5, i.e., all these images can pass the authentication. These results 
validate that the proposed scheme is not only designed to be robust to transmission errors, 
but also robust to general acceptable manipulations.  











Parameter Auto -40 Auto 10:1 1bpp 
SSM 0.159 0.159 0.262 0.017 0.057 
 
Sensitivity to Malicious Content Tampering 
An important aspect of our SSM-based authentication scheme is that it is sensitive to the 
malicious content tampering. For that reason, we tampered the previous watermarked Bike 
and Lena images and tested the ability of our system to detect and highlight the attacked 
areas. All the attacked images were detected and the possibly attacked areas were located. 




These results indicate that the ability of our system to detect tampering is good even in 
the presence of multiple tampered areas (Figure 4.14e), or noises (Figure 4.14a), or very 
small area modified (Figure 4.14c). Furthermore, the attack detection result of our scheme is 
friendly to the users. If the image fails to pass the authentication, our scheme provides 
detected attacked areas which concentrate on the objects. Further authentication decision 





(a) Noisy tampered image Lena (0.995) (b) Attacked areas detected of (a) 
   
(c) Lena with mole added (0.569) (d) Attacked areas detected of (c) 
  
(e) Attacked image Bike (0.995)  (f) Attacked areas detected of (e) 




4.5.2  System Security Analysis 
The security of our scheme can be justified by the false acceptance rate (FAR) and false 
rejection rate (FRR). For an image authentication system, FAR represents the rate that an 
image is actually modified by a malicious modifications but some tampered areas are not 
detected. On the other hand, FRR is the rate that an image is detected to be maliciously 
tampered but in fact it is not. A practical signature system should ensure that both FAR and 
FRR are reasonably small.  
The image authenticity verification of our scheme is based on the SSM, which is 
calculated using two statistical parameters (mccs and kurt) of the edge difference map. 
Referring to Figure 4.3, the longer the tail of the distribution of the difference map is, the 
larger the kurt is. Since malicious attack concentrates on image objects, the difference pixels 
are more likely to be connected (thus larger mccs) than acceptable manipulations. These two 
observations are combined to achieve good performance in our scheme. 
Let λ be the probability of connection with neighboring pixels in the feature difference 
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For acceptable manipulations, the kurta is small because its difference map is evenly 




initial (α/kurta), and p(mccsa = s) is also accumulated from large initial far away from the 
high density center of the distribution, i.e. Csk is very small. Furthermore, the connection 
factor λa is also small because the difference pixels are not likely to be connected, thus (λa) is 
close to zero.  
On the contrary, for malicious modifications, the kurtm is large due to the object-
concentrated modification. Therefore, FAR is accumulated from 0 to small end (α/kurtm). 
The probability for mccsm equal to s is also accumulated from large initial far away from the 
high density center of the distribution, i.e. Csk  is very small, and λm is also large.  
The tradeoff between FAR and FRR can be adjusted by the parameter α. Since 
nonlinear perceptual distance is used, the probabilities in the equations above are difficult to 
calculate. However, it is a reasonable conclusion from discussions above that both FAR and 
FRR will be very low. 
 
4.6 Summary 
An error resilient image authentication scheme using statistics and spatiality based measure 
(SSM) is presented in this chapter, which is robust to transmission errors in JPEG and 
JPEG2000 images. Many acceptable manipulations, which were incorrectly detected as 
malicious modifications by the previous schemes, were correctly classified by the proposed 
scheme in our experiments. These results support the observation that the feature difference 
patterns under typical acceptable image modifications or malicious ones is distinguishable. 
The results may indicate that the statistical and spatial properties of the image feature are 
helpful and useful in distinguishing acceptable image manipulations from malicious ones. 
The proposed SSM would improve system performance for content-based authentication 
schemes which use features containing spatial information, such as edge [7, 13], block DCT 




or block intensity histogram [16]. Furthermore, the proposed error resilient scheme based on 
SSM can improve the trustworthiness of digital images damaged by transmission errors by 
providing a way to distinguish them from digital forgeries.  
A limitation of the proposed measure is that it is suitable only for schemes using 
features containing spatial information since it is based on the statistical and spatial 
properties of feature differences. Further work would be needed to expand the use of the 
proposed measure by exploiting new discernable patterns in feature differences when the 




Chapter 5   
Image Forensics based on Image Quality 
Inconsistency Measure 
 
Digital watermarking and signature are main tools for active image authentication. 
However, most images captured today do not contain any digital watermark or signature, 
which motivate us to design techniques for passively checking the integrity of digital 
images. During digital forgery creation processing, there are always different sources of 
images spliced to create the final forgery. If the forgery is a composite image, it is hard to 
make various quality measures of the different parts consistent. Therefore, quality 
inconsistencies found in an image can serve as a proof for the existence of tampering.  
This chapter presents a digital image forensics technique based on image quality 
inconsistencies to detect the traces of image tampering. It is a passive image authentication 
approach, which checks image integrity in the absence of any active authentication code. 
For a given digital image, the distortions introduced during image acquisition are used as a 
“natural authentication code” to detect image integrity. A general framework of digital 
image forensics is proposed which is based on measuring the image quality inconsistencies 
of JPEG blocking artifacts and sharpness. To measure the quality inconsistencies, we 
propose to estimate blocking artifacts caused by JPEG compression based on quantization 
table estimation, and to measure the image sharpness based on the normalized Lipschitz 
exponent of wavelet modulus local maxima. Discovery of more quality measures related to 
distortions by image acquiring and operations may also be useful for image forensics. 
Experimental results have shown the effectiveness of the proposed measures in detecting 




5.1 Detecting Digital Forgeries by Measuring Image 
Quality Inconsistency 
Digital image forensics is an alternative solution to the active image authentication based on 
signature or watermark. Several statistical techniques have been proposed to detect the 
traces of specific manipulation applied to the image, such as detecting the resampling [44], 
copy-paste [17], JPEG recompression [18], and color filter array interpolation [45, 47]. 
Image forensics can also be based on the natural scene statistics [52], lighting direction 
inconsistencies [55], or camera response normality [43]. All these approaches are effective 
in some aspects, but new approaches are still desirable for practical applications. 
We propose to detect forgeries by measuring the image quality inconsistencies based 
on distortions introduced during image acquisition and processing. Digital images would 
bear the characteristics of their acquisition devices. The image acquisition and processing 
would introduce some pattern distortions into the images, which can be used as an intrinsic 
authentication code for detecting image integrity. Therefore, measures of these distortions 
are potentially useful for image forensics.  
There are many sources of distortions in the whole chain of images acquisition and 
manipulation, such as the distortion introduced by the lens, sensor noise, postprocessing 
distortions, and compression artifacts. General pipeline of digital imaging has been 




I S D= + ∑  (5.1) 
where Dk is the distortion introduced by the k-th operation during image acquiring and 




Digital forgeries may be created in various ways, but in general, the image forgery 
creation process involves selection, transformation, composition of the image fragments, 
and retouching of the final image. Although these manipulations are often imperceptible to 
the human eye, they may disturb the intrinsic image quality consistencies, which can be 
used as the evidence of existence of digital tampering. A digital forgery composed using 
different sources of images will inherit different image qualities, which deduces quality 
inconsistencies within different parts of the image. The quality inconsistencies in the image 
would be a good hint that it is a forgery. 
Our assumption is that if the image is authentic, then different regions of it should be 
consistent. Therefore, if the image qualities of some regions are abnormal or inconsistent 
with the others, then the image may be a forgery. Given two regions R1 and R2 in the image, 
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The quality differences could be detected by eliminating the image content (S1 and S2, 
respectively). Then the difference between these two regions can be calculated by the 
distance of the distortions:  
1 2( , ) ( , )1k 2k
k k
diff R R d D D= ∑ ∑  (5.3) 
Image quality measures are figures of merit used for the evaluation of imaging systems 
or coding/processing techniques. We consider several image quality metrics and study their 
statistical behavior when measuring various distortions. A good objective quality measure 
should well reflect the distortions on the image.  
Detecting image quality inconsistencies requires appropriate models of distortions 




image. However, the total effect of the distortions during image acquisition and processing 
includes various sources, and would interfere with each other. For example, if Gaussian 
noises are added into a JPEG compressed image, the compression artifacts of the image 
would change a lot and cannot be detected correctly. On the other hand, perfect detection of 
every distortion is very difficult, if it is not impossible, without the original scene S. 
However, it is still possible and feasible to extract some features from each distortion based 
on the prior knowledge of the processing characteristics.  
After the distortions from image regions are measured, the distance of them can be 
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To check the integrity of an image, we segment it into areas and then check the quality 
consistency of these segments. Suspicious area is selected as R1 for evaluation, and other 
areas are grouped as R2. If quality inconsistencies are detected, the image is deemed 
suspicious. By detecting the inconsistency of the segments, we could possibly tell whether 
or not the image is from one simple shot of one camera. For example, if the image contains 
a segment with high level of blocking artifacts, but others contains no or low level of 
blocking artifacts, then the image has high probability of being a forgery. Tools for 
detecting specific manipulations can be applied to each segments for detect quality measure. 
We have used blocking artifacts and sharpness as the measure to check the image quality 
consistency for image authentication. Other distortions can also be exploited, such as CCD 
noise, ringing artifacts caused by JPEG2000 compression, non-linear distortion caused by 





5.2 Detecting Image Quality Inconsistencies based 
on Blocking Artifacts 
JPEG image format is popularly used in most digital cameras and image processing 
software. Usually JPEG compression would introduce blocking artifacts. Manufacturers of 
digital cameras and image processing software typically use different JPEG quantization 
table to balance compression ratio and image quality. Such differences will also cause 
different blocking artifacts in the images acquired. When creating a digital forgery, the 
resulted tampered image may inherit different kind of blocking artifacts from different 
sources. These inconsistencies, when detected and measured, are used to check image 
integrity. Besides, forgeries creation process would also change the blocking artifacts, 
because the blocking artifacts of the affected blocks will change a lot by tampering 
operations such as image splicing, resampling, and local object operation such as skin 
optimization. Therefore, the blocking artifact inconsistencies found in a given image may 
tell the history of the processing the image has undergone.  
We present a passive way of detecting digital image forgery by measuring its quality 
inconsistency based on JPEG blocking artifacts. A new quantization table estimation based 
on power spectrum of the histogram of the DCT coefficients is firstly introduced, and the 
blocking artifact measure is calculated based on the estimated table. The inconsistencies of 
the JPEG blocking artifacts are then checked as a trace of image forgery. Our proposed 
approach is able to detect spliced image forgeries using different quantization table, or 
forgeries which would result in the blocking artifact inconsistencies in the whole images, 
such as block mismatching and object retouching. In addition, our proposed quantization 






5.2.1 Blocking Artifacts Caused by Lossy JPEG 
Compression 
JPEG compression is a block DCT-based image compression technology. A simplified 
pipeline of JPEG compression is illustrated in Figure 5.1. The image is firstly converted 
from RGB into a different colour space YCbCr. The Y component represents the brightness 
of a pixel. The Cb and Cr components together represent the chrominance. Then chroma 
subsampling (or called downsampling) is carried out to reduce the Cb and Cr components. 
Each component (Y, Cb, Cr) of the image is partitioned into blocks of eight by eight pixels 
each, then each block is converted to frequency space using discrete cosine transform. 
Quantization is done by simply dividing each component in the frequency domain by a 
constant for that component, and then rounding to the nearest integer. Finally, entropy 
coding is used to compress the DCT coefficients.  
 
Figure 5.1: Diagram of JPEG compression 
Digital cameras from different brands may use different JPEG quantization 
tables. Table 5.1 lists the default table of the finest quality setting of three brands cameras. 
The different tables used in JPGE compression brings with different quantization artifacts in 
the output images taken by the cameras. This intrinsic difference in the digital cameras 
provides us a “natural” authentication code for forensic analysis. 
From the JPEG compression pipeline, we can find that the main lossy operation in 
JPEG compression is the quantization process. In order to achieve low bit rates, quantization 
is normally used to compress the transform coefficients. Since the quantization process is 




at block boundaries of DCT-based compressed images. The blocking artifacts are caused by 
amplified differences between the boundary pixel values of neighboring blocks, or by 
undesirable high frequency components. The degradation is a result of a coarse quantization 
of the DCT coefficients of each image block without taking the inter-block correlations into 
account. 
Table 5.1: Quantization table of the finest settings for different cameras 
(a) Nikon Coolpix5400 (b) Canon Ixus500  (c) Sony P10  
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2  1 1 1 2 3 6 8 10  1 1 1 1 1 2 3 3
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2  1 1 2 3 4 8 9 8  1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3
1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2  2 2 2 3 6 8 10 8  1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3
1 1 1 1 2 3 3 2  2 2 3 4 7 12 11 9  1 1 1 1 3 4 4 3
1 1 1 2 3 4 4 3  3 3 8 11 10 16 15 11  1 1 2 3 3 5 5 4
1 1 2 3 3 4 5 4  3 5 8 10 12 15 16 13  1 2 3 3 4 5 6 5
2 3 3 3 4 5 5 4  7 10 11 12 15 17 17 14  2 3 4 4 5 6 6 5
3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  14 13 13 15 15 14 14 14  4 5 5 5 6 5 5 5
 
JPEG compression introduces specific correlations in the form of blocking artifacts. 
When creating a digital forgery, a typical pattern is to load images into an image processing 
software such as Adobe Photoshop, splice them together, and then save the composite 
image. If the forgery comes from different JPEG compressed images, it would inherit 
different kind of blocking artifacts.  
Digital tampering will also change the blocking artifacts. For example, the blocking 
artifacts of the affected blocks would be changed a lot by image splicing, resampling, and 
some other special manipulations such as skin optimization for portrait images. The 
inconsistencies of the JPEG compression artifacts would also be caused by block 





5.2.2 Blocking Artifact Measure based on Quantization Table 
Estimation 
Blocking artifact measure plays an important role in the areas of image and video processing 
such as optimal bit allocation and post-processing [106]. Here we explore it to detect the 
image forgeries. As discussed above, the blocking artifacts are caused mainly by 
quantization. Therefore, the quantization table used during JPEG compression is useful for 
precise estimation of the blocking artifacts.  
Blocking artifact for each block is estimated via: 
64
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where B(i) is the estimated blocking artifact measure for the testing block i, and D(k) is the 
DCT coefficient at position k. Q(1:64) is the estimated DCT quantization table. The 
blocking artifact measure (BAM) for the whole image is then calculated based on the 





= ∑  (5.6) 
where N is the total number of image blocks. 
JPEG quantization table estimation has been useful for JPEG artifact removal [107], 
image enhancement or JPEG re-compression. To estimate the JPEG quantization table, a 
method called maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is proposed in [104, 105] based on 
the total estimated blocking artifact at DCT frequency i given an estimated step Q(i). In 
[58], a statistical model based on Benford’s law for the probability distribution of the first 
digits of the JPEG coefficients is used to estimate the JPEG quantization factor. For a given 
candidate Q(i), a complicated maximum likelihood estimation based on quantization 
artifacts of the whole coefficients must be computed. Therefore, these methods are very 




sub-section, we present a faster quantization table estimation algorithm based on histogram 
power spectrum of DCT coefficients. 
We propose to use the power spectrum of the DCT coefficient histogram of each 
portion to estimate the quantization step of it. It is observed that if the histogram of DCT 
coefficients contain periodic patterns, then the coefficients are very likely to have been 
quantized with a step of this period [104]. These periodic artifacts are particularly visible in 
the Fourier domain as strong peaks in the mid and high frequencies. Therefore, the 
derivatives of the histogram power spectrum of DCT coefficients could be used to estimate 
the quantization table. 
We firstly calculate the histogram (H) of the DCT coefficients at position i, and then 
calculate the histogram power spectrum (P) using the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). The 
second order derivative (S) of P is then low-pass filtered. Finally, the number of negative 
local minimum of S is found to be (Q(i)-1). Suppose f(x) is a function of x that is twice 
differentiable at a stationary point x. A stationary point may be a local minimum, maximum, 
or inflection point. If f '(x)=0 and f "(x)<0, then has a relative maximum at x. For this aim, 
we filter S to get a more clear pattern for calculating Q(i), by eliminating the positive values 





(a) Histogram of AC Coefficient (q=4) 
 
(b) Histogram of AC Coefficient (q= 1) 
Figure 5.2: Histogram of DCT coefficients  
Figure 5.2 shows the DCT coefficient histograms for a JPEG compressed image and 
the original uncompressed image. The histogram was calculated for the coefficients at DCT 
frequency Q(6) (the fifth AC component). We can see that these two histograms are very 
similar, except that for JPEG compressed image (Figure 5.2a) there are some peaks at the 
positions of multiple of q (here q=4). Note also that this type of period is not present in the 




The periodic peaks in the histogram are particularly visible in its power spectrum as 
strong peaks (Figure 5.3). In Figure 5.3, we show the power spectrum of the histograms of 
an uncompressed image and the JPEG compressed image. The histogram (H) of the DCT 
coefficients at position i is firstly calculated, and then the histogram power spectrum (P) is 
achieved using the Fast Fourier Transform.  
   
(a) Power Spectrum of Histogram (q=4) (b) Power Spectrum of Histogram (q= 1) 
    
(c) 2nd order Difference of Power Spectrum (q=4)  (d) Filtered 2nd order Difference 
(q=4) 
Figure 5.3: Power spectrum of DCT coefficient histogram 
The estimated power spectra of the two images are shown in Figure 5.3(a) and Figure 
5.3(b), respectively. A combined view of those peaks provides us with a clear view of the 
quantization step used. The second order derivative (S) of P is then low-pass filtered, and 
the positive values are eliminated. The reason is that if there is a local maximum f(x) at x, 




local minimum of S is found to be equal to (Q(i)-1). The second differentiable S and its 
filtered version are shown in Figure 5.3(c) and Figure 5.3(d), respectively. 
We use the whole image to estimate quantization table. The procedure of the 
quantization table estimation is: (1) Calculate DCT coefficients of each 8×8 image block; 
(2) Calculate the power spectrum (P) of the histogram of DCT coefficients for each of the 
64 frequencies; (3) Calculate the second derivative of P, and then low-pass filtering it; (4) 
Calculate the local minimum number (Num) of the filtered second derivative of P; (4) the 
estimated quantization step of the DCT frequency is estimated as Num+1.  
Our proposed blocking artifact estimation algorithm is faster than that of 
[104, 105, 58]. The reason is that for a DCT coefficient at a given position, the algorithm 
proposed in [104, 105] need to calculate the blocking artifact for every possible Q based on 
the DCT coefficients of the whole image. On the contrary, our algorithm only computes 
once. Furthermore, our algorithm can estimate arbitrary quantization table which is often 
adopted in different brand of digital camera, whereas the algorithm proposed in [58] can 
only detect a standard compression factor, since it re-compress the image by a sequence of 
preset Q-factors. This step also makes the algorithm in [58] slower than our proposed one. 
 
5.2.3 Detection of Quality Inconsistencies based on Blocking 
Artifact Measure 
Given a digital image, the blocking artifacts introduced during image compression could be 
used as a “natural authentication code” to check its integrity. We observed that when an 
adversary forges an image, JPEG images from different sources such as different digital 
cameras or by different manipulations are usually used. Such forgery usually makes the 
blocking artifact measurements inconsistent. Therefore, image forgeries could be done by 




To check the integrity of an image, we first segment it into areas and then check the 
blocking artifact consistency of these segments. Suspicious areas are selected for evaluation, 
the other areas are used to estimate the quantization table, and the BAM of the image is 
calculated based on the estimated table. If the blocking artifact inconsistencies are detected, 
the image is deemed suspicious. By detecting the inconsistency of the segments, we could 
possibly tell whether or not the image is from one simple shot of one camera. 
 
5.2.4 Experimental Results and Discussions 
Our test images are photos taken by digital cameras including Nikon Coolpix5400, Canon 
Ixus500, Sony P10, and Canon A85, which are all commercially available cameras, with 4 
or 5 mega-pixels CCD, and 3× or 4× optical lens. All photos are saved in JPEG format. The 
test images were taken in different time under various environments. 
First of all we evaluate the DCT statistics of the digital images and also the differences 
within images by different cameras, as shown in Table 5.1. The quantization tables used by 
cameras of different brands are different.  
Our proposed quantization table estimation algorithm is much faster than that of 
[104, 105, and 58]. Table 5.2 shows the results of quantization table estimation of our 
proposed method, compared with the optimization based method used in [104, 105]. The 
test image is Lena with dimension 512×512, quantized with JPEG factor from 100 to 50. 
These results were generated with program compiled by Visual C++ 6.0 on Dell Dimension 
8250 PC (3060 MHz CPU, 512MB memory, and Windows XP operation system). From the 
results we can see that our method is much faster. The reason would be that for each given 
DCT coefficient, the algorithms in [104, 105] need to calculate blocking artifact for every 
possible Q(i) based on the DCT coefficients of the whole image. On the contrary, our 




quantization table which is often adopted in different brand of digital cameras, whereas the 
algorithm proposed in [58] can only detect a standard compression factor, since it re-
compress the image by a sequence of preset Q-factors. This step also makes the algorithm in 
[58] slower than our proposed one. On the other hand, the estimation errors of 64 
quantization steps grow when quantization factor decreases. The reason would be that the 
high frequency DCT coefficients would be all zero when quantized by large step size. 
Therefore, we only use the first 32 DCT frequencies in blocking artifact estimation. 
Table 5.2: Quantization table estimation time (ms)  
Quality factor 100 90 80 70 60 50 
MLE based method 15091 14957 14893 14950 14828 14737 
Proposed method 241 227 228 225 222 228 
 
We evaluated the inconsistencies of the JPEG blocking artifacts to detect the digital 
tampering in the image. A portrait taken from JPEG2000 test image Woman is extracted 
using Adobe Photoshop and spliced into a landscape taken by Canon Ixus500. There is 
typical inconsistencies in this composed forgery (Figure 5.4a). We detected blocking artifact 
measures for all blocks of the image (Figure 5.4b).  Figure 5.4(b) shows there are actually 
two different types of artifacts in different areas of the image, which may denote the 
inconsistent areas.  
We also evaluated the inconsistencies of the JPEG compression blocking artifacts due 
to resampling and misaligned blocks. Figure 5.5 shows a forgery photo, which was 
composed by two photos taken by the same cameras under the same conditions. Due to 
resampling and misaligning, the DCT coefficients of the spliced regions are shuffled, and no 
period bumps occur in the histogram power spectrum any more.  
Some other tampering operations during composing forgery will also render some 
inconsistencies. Figure 5.6 shows a typical face skin optimization operation widely used by 




5.6(b) can be detected by our technique, with a blocking artifact measure of 45.419, but only 
5.854 for the original untouched photo. 
 
(a) tampered image 
 
(b) blocking artifact detected 
Figure 5.4: Forgery from two images by different sources (spliced from JPEG2000 





(a) tampered Image (a pile of stones added) 
 
 (b) blocking Artifact Detected 




   
(a) Original image Cropped;  (b) Face skin optimized; 
 
(c) Blocking artifact detected 
Figure 5.6: Face skin optimized detection 
We also test our algorithm with various photos, 400 taken from Nikon Coolpix 5400, 
and 100 from Sony P10. We generate a tampered photo by randomly selecting another 
photo and splicing it into to the original one. The detected artifact measures are shown 
in Figure 5.7. For untouched photos, the artifact measures are all smaller than those of the 





Figure 5.7: Measures for tampered or authentic images 
As a passive way of image authentication, in some cases, quality based image forensics 
would fail to detect the forgeries. When the quality of the tampered image is very low (for 
example, the image has been highly compressed or reduced to small dimension), it is 
difficult for image forensics to detect the trace of the tampering based on image quality. For 
example, in Figure 5.8(a), we reduced the dimension of the tampered image shown in Figure 
5.4(a) from 2592×1944 to 400×300, and compressed it with JPEG compression factor 20. 
The blocking artifacts in Figure 5.8(a) can be found easily, especially on the high contrast 
areas. Figure 5.8(b) shows the detected blocking artifacts, in which there are no clear areas 
identified with different class of blocking artifact measures. That is to say, in this case, 
blocking artifact based image forensics would fail. The reason may be that the low image 
quality has concealed the traces, the inconsistencies of blocking artifacts, of the tampering. 
For low quality images, new forensics techniques may be required, such as image forensics 






(a) tampered image with low quality (downsampled and highly compressed) 
 
(b) detected blocking artifact measure 





5.3 Sharpness Measure for Detecting Image Quality 
Inconsistencies 
Sharpness is a very important photographic image quality factor. It is defined by the 
boundaries between zones of different tones or colors. Sharpness is affected by:  
•  Lens: design and manufacturing quality, focal length, aperture, and distance from 
the image center; 
• Sensor: pixel count and anti-aliasing filter; 
• Shooting variances: camera shaking, focus accuracy, lighting, and atmosphere 
disturbances (thermal effects and aerosols). 
One way to measure sharpness is in pixel domain, including analysis of statistical 
properties and correlation between pixels. In addition, techniques based on image gradient 
and Laplacian, and which detect the slope of the edges in an image, for example, the 
perceptual blur metric [108]. It detects edge first, and then scans each row of the image to 
locate edge pixels. The start and end positions of the edge are defined as the locations of 
local maxima closest to edge. The edge width is calculated as the distance between the end 
and start position. The overall metric is calculated as the average of the edge widths or the 
local blur values over all edges found. The relative contrast at a given spatial frequency 
(output contrast/input contrast) is called the Modulation Transfer Function (MTF) or Spatial 
Frequency Response (SFR). MTF is widely used by photographers to evaluate the camera 
sharpness. However, the calculation of MTF requires an image of variously sized bar 
patterns of the camera, or manually select the similar pattern from the image. It is not 
suitable for no-reference image sharpness assessment. In addition, these pixel based 
approaches is sensitive to noise, and the required edge selection is complicated, and usually 




To get around these problems, the measurements in the frequency domain can be used 
[ 109]. An approach based on the occurrence histogram of non-zero DCT coefficients 
through all 8×8 blocks of the image is proposed in [109]. The assumption is that sharper 
edges increase the high frequency components. The blurriness metric is estimated by 
examining the number of coefficients that are almost always zero by counting the number of 
zeroes in the histogram. Note that the metric is higher for sharper images. However, 
sharpness metrics that use the whole frequency spectrum of the image cannot separate the 
sharpness information from the scene content. The sharpness metrics that use spatial 
gradients of the edges work only for comparisons among images of the same scene. 
Therefore, a content independent, no-reference sharpness metric is desirable. A sharpness 
measure based on Gaussian lines and edges is proposed in [110]. It locates these lines and 
edges in the image, and then the sharpness of these lines and edges is determined by fitting a 
Gaussian line or edge profile to the Gaussian derivative signature. Another feasible measure 
is the sharpness metric based on local kurtosis, edge and energy information [111], which is 
based on averaged edge profile kurtosis. This algorithm is a combination of the spatial 
domain edge profile acutance, and the kurtosis of the frequency spectrum algorithms. 
A combined pixel domain and frequency domain approach based on edge and kurtosis 
of DCT has been proposed [111]. An edge profile is detected by detecting edge pixels and 
enclosing them with 8×8 pixel blocks. For each block, sharpness using Kurtosis of the DCT 
is computed. The final metric is the average sharpness of the blocks in the edge profile.  
In this section, we propose to use wavelet transform based sharpness measure for 
sharpness inconsistency detection. The proposed measure is based on normalized Lipschitz 
exponent of wavelet as well as relation with module maxima, which is robust to noise 





5.3.1 Lipschitz Exponents of Wavelet 
Wavelet domain is a better choice than DCT as the frequency domain for the purpose of 
sharpness assessment. The reason is that the wavelet transform has the characteristic of the 
multi-resolution and can describe the local features of the signal both in the time and 
frequency domain, thus it can get the detail of the signal at the different scales [112]. 
Wavelet can detect local signal singularity, which is good for edge detection. Multiscale 
statistics of wavelet can give theoretic explanation why wavelet can measure sharpness well. 
For example, the effectiveness of edge detection based on multiscale wavelet modulus 
maxima is validated in [100]. 
One signal sharp variation produces wavelet modulus maxima at different scales. The 
value of a wavelet modulus maximum at a scale s measures the derivative of the signal 
smoothed at the scale, but it is not clear how to combine these different values to 
characterize the signal variation. The wavelet theory gives an answer to this question by 
showing that the modulus maximum of each scale of the wavelet transform depends on the 
local Lipschitz regularity of the signal.  
Edge is a significant feature for image on human vision. Image edges are counterpart to 
image gray singularity, and different types of edge have different singularities. A parameter 
that depicts singularity is Lipschitz exponent. In mathematics theory, the singularity of the 
signal as the sharp variation of the signal can be expressed precisely by the Lipschitz 
exponent.  
Definition: A function f (t) is said to be Lipschitz α at t0, if and only if there exists two 
constants K and h0>0, and a polynomial of order n (n is a positive integer), Pn(t), such that 
for h<h0: 
0 0( ) ( ) | |nf t h P t K h




The value K gives the amplitude of the sharp variation. Mallat proved [112] that 
if ( , )f x y  is Lipschitz α at (x0, y0), then there exists a constant K such that for all point (x, y) 
in a neighborhood of (x0, y0) and any scale s: 
( , )sW f x y Ks
α≤  (5.8) 
which is equivalent to: 
log ( , ) log logsW f x y K sα≤ +  (5.9) 
where Ws ( , )f x y is the wavelet transform of ( , )f x y at scale s. ( , )sW f x y represents the 
modulus of Ws ( , )f x y at scale s. The Lipschitz regularity is given by the maximum slope of 
log ( , )sW f x y  as a function of log s  along the lines of modulus maxima that converge 
towards point ( , )x y . In the wavelet domain, it is possible to calculate the Lipschitz exponent 
in a certain point in the image from the evolution of the modulus maxima of the wavelet 
coefficients corresponding to that point through successive scales. 
 
5.3.2 Normalized Lipschitz Exponent (NLE) 
Lipschitz exponent has been used to estimate the blurness in an image [113], but Lipschitz 
exponent alone is not adequate. The reason may be that Lipschitz exponent only describes 
the singularity of the signal. For sharpness evaluation, the amplitude of the sharp variation 
should also be considered. For example, the signal in Figure 5.9(a) with different Delta and 
Step settings will have a unique Lipschitz exponent 1. However, for sharpness evaluation, 
different setting of Delta and Step would cause different sharpness effect. From the wavelet 
values of different Delta or Step (Figure 5.9c and Figure 5.9d), we can find that the local 
maxima change linearly with Delta or Step. Therefore, for sharpness evaluation, the 




   
(a) ideal signal that is differentiable once (b) different scale wavelet transform 




































(c) wavelet transform of different Delta (d) wavelet transform of different Step 
Figure 5.9: Multiscale wavelet modulus maxima for different sharp edges 
Therefore, we propose to use normalized Lipschitz exponent (NLE) as a measure of 
how sharp the image is at a certain point. The NLE is defined as / log Kα , and then Equation  
(5.9) becomes: 
log ( , )
1 log 1 log
log log
sW f x y s NLE s
K K
α≤ + = +  (5.10) 
 Our method for sharpness estimation is based on estimating the NLEs of the sharpest 
edges in the image. To analyze the edges in the image, we calculate the NLE in all points 
where a change in intensity is found either in the horizontal or vertical direction. In the 
wavelet domain, it is possible to calculate the NLE in a certain point in the image from the 
evolution of the modulus maxima of the wavelet coefficients corresponding to that point 




5.3.3 Wavelet NLE based Sharpness Measure  
The procedure of the proposed sharpness measure can be described as follows: (1) The 
wavelet decomposition of the image is calculated; (2) the modulus maxima of the wavelet 
coefficients corresponding to a certain point in the image through different resolution scales 
are detected; (3) the normalized Lipschitz exponent in that point is calculated by nonlinear 
fitting an exponential curve to the modulus maxima versus the scale; (4) from the Lipschitz 
exponents found along the significant edges in the image, a histogram is achieved; (5) the 
center of gravity (CG) of the histogram is related to the sharpness of the image. The 
sharpness measure is calculated based on the estimated CG of the NLEs with sigmoid 
function. 
 
Continuous Wavelet Transform 
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θ s (x, y), the θ (x, y) at scale s, is defined as:  
( , ) ( , )s
x yx y
s s
θ θ=  (5.12) 
The first differentiation of θ (x, y) in the x, y direction is used to be two wavelet 
functions: 
2 2
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Therefore, for a 2-dimensional function, in the scale s, its two fractions of the wavelet 
transform are: 
(1) (1)( , ) ( , ) * ( , )s sW f x y f x y x yϕ=  (5.15) 
(2) (2)( , ) ( , )* ( , )s sW f x y f x y x yϕ=  (5.16) 
where * represents convolution function. The modulus of the wavelet transform is: 
(1) 2 (2) 2( , ) | ( , ) | | ( , ) |s s sW f x y W f x y W f x y= +  (5.17) 
 
Local Maxima Detection 
The former computation is provided for the edge point of the image signal. The first step is 
to find the edge of the image. From Equation(5.15) and Equation(5.16), we know that the x 
and y fractions of the wavelet transform are the image’s gradients, and that the modulus 
maximum of the wavelet transform is the image’s edge point. Considering the very 
smoothing area of the image will also produce the modulus maximum point with small 
value which will result in computational error easily. Therefore, a template of edge is used 
to remove those false edges. Those points are selected as edge points, which are larger than 
half of the local maxima and larger than the average wavelet modulus at every scale. 
Because we restrict the Lipschitz exponents to those corresponding to transitions with large 
amplitude, we already selected the sharpest transitions with large amplitudes in the image. 
 
Normalized Lipschitz Exponent Estimation 
In actual computation, the edge points’ smoothing factors are different, thus the statistical 
histogram method is used. Four scales (1, 2, 3 and 4) of wavelet transform are used, since 
the first 4 scales of wavelet transform carry enough information about the character of local 




(NLEs) of the selected local maxima are estimated by linear least-squares data fitting. The 
number of the histogram bins is 100, and the Centre of Gravity (CG) of the histogram is 
related to the sharpness of the image. 
 
Sharpness Measure 
The final sharpness measure is then calculated with the sigmoid function based on the 
estimated CG of the NLEs (CGNLE): 
( )sigmf ( ;[  ]) 1 NLENLE b CG c
aspn a CG b c
e− −
= = +  (5.18) 
In our experiments, the parameters [a  b c] are set to [2 -2 0.26] empirically.  
 
 
5.3.4 Experimental Results and Discussions 
In order to evaluate the proposed sharpness measure, an image of step signal (Figure 5.10a) 
is used for testing. Its Lipschitz exponent is 0. The modulus maximum of the wavelet 
transform of the original and its blurred image are in the four apexes of the rectangle. We 
did the continuous wavelet transform with the scale from 1 to 8, obtaining the corresponding 
modulus maxima. The results are shown in Figure 5.11(a). The normalized wavelet modulus 





       
  (a) image Step    (b) blurred image with σ=1    (c) blurred image with σ=2    (d) 
blurred image with σ=3 
Figure 5.10: Test image and its blurred versions 
 
(a) wavelet modulus maxima of different scale 
 
(b) normalized wavelet transform modulus maxima  
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α≤  (5.19) 
2 2
0s s σ= +  (5.20) 
The normalized wavelet transform modulus is useful in sharpness estimation. The 
Gaussian variances are estimated with non-linear least-squares data fitting by the Gauss-
Newton method. The results for image Step are shown in Figure 5.12(a) and (b). The results 
for real image Lena are shown in Figure 5.13 (c) and (d). From Figure 5.13 we can find that 
the model defined by Equation (5.19) and Equation (5.20) is perfect for ideal step signal, but 
not so well for real image Lena. The reason may be the blurness inherent in the real images 
which could not be modeled as Gaussian.  
In Figure 5.14 we show the results of the performance of the proposed NLE, compared 
with the original approach using Lipschitz exponent only. The histograms of the Lipschitz 
exponent α, K and NLE of image Lena and its blurred versions (with variance σ equal to 1, 2 
and 3) are shown in Figure 5.14 (a), (b) and (c), respectively. The histograms of α of 
different blurred images have different shapes. The blurred image with larger σ has a 
smaller K on average than that with smaller σ. After normalization, the histograms of NLE 
are much more regular than those of α. Therefore, NLE is better in distinguishing different 






(a) curve fitting for image Step 
 
(b) blur estimation of image Step 







(a) curve fitting for image Lena 
 
(b) blur estimation of image Lena 






(a) histograms of estimated Lipschitz α 
 
(b) histograms of estimated K  
  
(c) histograms of estimated NLE 






(a) CG of Lipschitz exponent and NLE of blurred images 
 
(b) Sharpness estimation for blurred images  
Figure 5.15: Comparisons of α and NLE 
We further tested our algorithm with larger σ of Gaussian blurring, ranging from 0 to 
14. The detected CG of Lipschitz exponent and that of NLE are shown in Figure 5.15(a). 
When input σ increases, the CG of α increase nearly linearly when is σ small. But when σ 
gets larger and larger, the increasing rate of α becomes smaller. Therefore, the whole curve 




The estimated sharpness measures by Equation (5.18) are shown in Figure 5.15(b). 
Similarly, the curve of sharpness based on NLE is much more linear than that based on the 
Lipschitz exponent. These results validate that NLE is more suitable in evaluation of image 
sharpness than Lipschitz exponent. 
 
5.4 Summary 
The proposed passive approach to detect digital forgery by checking image quality 
inconsistencies is able to distinguish digital forgeries from authentic images in the absence 
of any digital watermark or signature. Image quality inconsistencies based on JPEG 
blocking artifacts and image sharpness are successfully detected as possible evidences that 
the image had been tampered with. The results support the hypothesis that image quality 
inconsistencies could serve as a useful intrinsic signature for revealing traces of digital 
tampering. This is attributed to the observation that a digital forgery composed of different 
sources of images usually contains quality inconsistencies introduced by forgery creation 
operations. The proposed image quality inconsistency based image forensics technique 
provides a passive approach for image authentication, and its development may help provide 
a better understanding of the role of image quality for detecting digital forgeries. A 
limitation of the proposed approach is that it is not suitable for low quality images. Further 
work would be needed to develop forensics techniques to check image content consistency 





Chapter 6   
Conclusions and Further Work 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
The main purpose of the work presented in this thesis is to protect the trustworthiness of 
digital images, either actively when the received image is damaged by transmission errors or 
passively when there is no side information available. The purpose was achieved by 
exploiting the statistical and spatial properties of features to authenticate damaged images, 
and by measuring image quality inconsistencies to detect digital image forgeries passively. 
This chapter concludes the results of the research work present in the previous chapters, and 
some areas of future work are suggested. 
 
6.1.1 Error Resilient Image Authentication 
An error resilient image authentication scheme has been developed for JPEG images, which 
incorporates watermarking, ECC, and error concealment into traditional crypto signature 
scheme to enhance the system robustness. Pre-processing and block shuffling techniques are 
adopted to stabilize the features for signature generation and verification. This scheme 
correctly could distinguish JPEG images damaged by lossy transmission from malicious 
forgeries, which has been validated by our experimental results. It is only designed for 
images using small block-based coding (8×8 DCT transform in JPEG images). Therefore, 
an improved scheme using a feature distance measure named statistics and spatiality based 




errors in images received by lossy transmission. It is not constrained to block-based coded 
images, and then it is suitable for both JPEG and JPEG2000 images. 
 The proposed error resilient schemes improve the trustworthiness of the images 
damaged by transmission errors, by providing solutions to verify their authenticity even if 
there are uncorrectable errors. Many acceptable manipulations, which were incorrectly 
detected as malicious modifications by other schemes, were correctly verified by our 
scheme in our experiments. These results support the observation that the feature difference 
patterns under typical acceptable image modifications or malicious ones is distinguishable. 
The results may indicate that the statistical and spatial properties of the image feature are 
useful in distinguishing acceptable image manipulations from malicious content 
modifications.  
The proposed SSM would improve system performance for content-based 
authentication schemes which use features containing spatial information, such as edge 
[7, 13], block DCT coefficients based features [8, 14, 15], highly compressed version of the 
original image [9], or block intensity histogram [16]. Furthermore, the proposed error 
resilient scheme based on SSM can improve the trustworthiness of digital images damaged 
by transmission errors by providing a way to distinguish them from digital forgeries. The 
images damaged by transmission error can be well error-concealed by the proposed error 
concealment algorithms, and can be verified by the proposed schemes. Therefore, the 
damaged images can now be with good quality, and those images that pass the verification 
are believable. Moreover, the results would lead to a better understanding of the role of 





6.1.2 Image Forensics based on Image Quality 
Inconsistencies 
Detection of digital forgery without assistance of signature or watermarking is an emerging 
research task. In this thesis, an image forensics technique has been proposed to detect digital 
forgeries by checking image quality inconsistencies. It aims to distinguish digital forgeries 
from authentic images in the absence of any digital watermark or signature. This scheme is 
based on image inconsistencies using blocking artifact measure and sharpness measure. It 
can detect digital forgeries if the forgery image is a composite from different sources, or 
there is resampling, sharpness related operations during forgery construction. In our 
experiments, image quality inconsistencies based on JPEG compression blocking artifacts 
and sharpness measures were successfully detected as possible evidences when the image 
had been tampered with.  
 The proposed image forensics technique provides an approach for passive image 
authentication, which makes digital images more trustworthy. Its development may help 
provide a better understanding of the role of image quality in digital image forensics. The 
experimental results support the hypothesis that image quality inconsistencies could serve as 
a useful signature for revealing traces of digital tampering. This may be attributed to the 
observation that a digital forgery composed of different sources of images usually contains 
quality inconsistencies introduced by forgery creation operations.  
 
6.2 Summary of Contributions 
We describe active and passive approaches for image authentication to protect digital image 
trustworthiness. These approaches work in active way based on hybrid digital watermark 




provide a solution of error resilient image authentication and image forensics by exploring 
the role of image properties or quality measures in detecting digital forgeries. All these 
techniques have been validated by our experimental results. In summary, the work described 
in this thesis made the following contributions: 
• Unique error resilient image authentication schemes for images transmission over 
lossy channels. These schemes can authenticate images correctly even if there 
uncorrectable transmission errors. That is, these schemes can distinguish those 
images damaged by transmission errors or distorted by some acceptable 
manipulations from forged images. (Chapter 3 and 4) 
• Feature distance measure for content-based image authentication that can 
improve the performance of image authentication by improve it robustness. This 
measure is based on statistical and spatial properties of the image feature. 
(Chapter 4) 
• Error concealment techniques for JPEG and JPEG2000 images. They can 
improve qualities of those images damaged by acceptable errors, which can 
improve their authenticities and make them more distinguishable from forgeries. 
(Chapter 3 and 4) 
• Image forensics scheme based on measuring quality inconsistencies. It provides a 
passive way to check the integrity of digital images, and can be extended by using 
more no-reference quality measures. (Chapter 5) 
• Blind measure of blocking artifacts caused by JPEG compression and image 
sharpness measure based on wavelet Lipschitz. These no-reference measures are 





6.3 Future Work 
Seeing may be believing again in the future with the well-developed image authentication 
techniques. In order to achieve this vision, a lot of works are still required to be done in the 
future. Possible directions would include robust image authentication that can distinguish 
acceptable manipulations from malicious contend modification, and passive image forensics 
tools based on other image quality measure or natural scene statistics. 
A limitation of the proposed feature distance measure for content based image 
authentication is that it is suitable only for schemes using features containing spatial 
information since it is based on statistical and spatial properties of the feature differences. 
Further work would be needed to expand the use of the proposed measure by exploiting new 
discernable patterns of feature differences when the features contain no spatial information. 
Furthermore, many active image authentication schemes reject manipulations that may 
preserve better perceptual quality or semantic meaning than acceptable manipulations. Lack 
of a clear-cut distinction between acceptable and malicious modifications make it difficult to 
accurately distinguish acceptable manipulations from malicious ones. To be robust to 
acceptable modifications yet sensitive to malicious content modifications, additional work 
could be done to extract features that adequately describe the perceptual content of the 
image signal, or to design feature distance measure that exploits statistics or perceptual 
properties of image signals.  
On the other hand, the proposed image quality based passive image authentication 
supports our idea of assessing image authenticity by checking quality inconsistencies. This 
thesis has proposed blocking artifact and sharpness measures to detect image quality 
inconsistencies for forensic analysis. Discovery of more quality measures related to 
distortions by image acquiring and operations is then a promising direction of further work 
of the image forensics. The consistencies related to pattern noise of digital imaging devices 




the process of creating a forgery is complicated, which would damage the intrinsic quality 
consistencies of digital images. Further work on careful evaluation of how the image is 
acquired or tampered with would be required to discover more reliable quality inconsistency 
measure for image forensics.  
The possible image quality measures for image forensics to be explored in future could 
be based on pattern noise of imaging system. There are many sources of noise in images 
obtained by imaging sensor, such as dark current noise, shot noise, circuit noise, and fixed 
pattern noise [114]. Digital images contain an inherent amount of noise that is largely 
uniformly distributed across an entire image. Statistical properties of the pattern noise, such 
as variance and kurtosis of noise distribution, may serve as an intrinsic watermark to verify 
image authenticity. The reason may be that the detected inconsistencies of the pattern noise 
would indicate that the image may be a faked image. On the other hand, when creating 
digital forgeries, it is common to add small amounts of localized noise to tampered regions 
in order to conceal traces of tampering (e.g., at a splice boundary). As a result, local noise 
levels across the image may become inconsistent.  
Noise estimation is useful to detect forgery image regions from different ISO setting or 
light environment. An image is split into a number of blocks and select smooth blocks that 
are classified by the standard deviation of intensity of a block, where the standard deviation 
(σ) is computed from the difference of the selected block images between the noisy input 
image and its filtered image: 
ˆ( ) ( ( ))std N std I F Iσ = = −  (6.1) 
where Nˆ is the estimated noise, std( Nˆ ) is the standard deviation of Nˆ , and F(I) is a 
filtering function of image I. Several denoising filters [115, 116, 117, 118] can be used for 
feature extraction. Further works can be done on the selection denoising filter. 
The image quality used in this thesis can be called as natural-imaging quality, which 




the case of CCD camera consists of low-pass filtering, lens-distortion, color filter array 
interpolation, white-balancing, quantization, and non-linear transformation [66]. On the 
other hand, Natural Scene Statistics (NSS) studies aims to observe, discover and explain the 
statistical regularities in natural images [119]. NSS, being a form of natural image model, 
has found application in texture synthesis, image compression, image classification and 
image denoising. Researchers have developed sophisticated models to characterize NSS 
[120, 121, 122].  
Image manipulations would perturb the natural images statistical properties. Images of 
the visual environment captured using high quality capture devices operating in the visual 
spectrum are broadly classified as natural scenes. Images of the three dimensional visual 
environment come from a common class: the class of natural scenes. Natural scenes form a 
tiny subspace in the space of all possible signals, and researchers have developed 
sophisticated models to characterize these statistics [120]. The malicious modifications will 
disturb these natural scene statistics, and introduce some inconsistencies into images. 
Discovery of how the malicious modifications disturb natural scene statistics may be useful 
to detect maliciously modifications. To discovery how the malicious modifications disturb 
the natural scene statistics is another possible solution for detect digital forgeries.  
With the rapid development of digital technologies in video application, deliberate 
attack on valuable video is becoming easier. It is also possible to extend some techniques 
developed in this thesis to video authentication. In fact, some image authentication solutions 
can be directly employed in the frame-based video authentication if a video sequence is 
considered as a series of image frames [ 123]. Fox example, the hybrid signature and 
watermark authentication scheme may be useful in video authentication. The feature 
distance function proposed in this thesis would be helpful to improve video authentication 
performance. The idea of detecting digital forgeries by quality inconsistencies may also 
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